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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that trial

counsel's failure to investigate and impeach the testimony of the
state's key witness, a confidential informant who provided the
only direct evidence at trial of the alleged drug sale, did not
deprive defendant of his constitutional rights to competent
representation, confrontation, and a fair trial?
2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to

address the plain error of trial counsel's failure to object to
plain hearsay testimony which acted to corroborate the testimony
of the confidential informant, simply because the issue was not
raised until defendant's reply brief?
3.

Whether defendant's appellate counsel's failure to raise

the issue of trial counsel's failure to object to plain hearsay
until the reply brief deprived defendant of his constitutional
right to competent representation on appeal?
4.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the

prosecutor's role in creating the false impression to the jury
that the confidential informant had been incarcerated
continuously from the time of the undercover operation to the
time of trial, when in reality he had received early release
shortly after the undercover operation, did not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct?
5.

Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendants'

probation, where the state failed to present evidence that the
alleged probation violation was willful?
6.

Whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that

defendant's arrest, which did not comply with Utah law, was
illegal, thereby invalidating the search incident to arrest?
OPINION BELOW
State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 022, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
On February 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in this case (Appendix A).

Jurisdiction is conferred on

this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (1996) and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1996).
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-13-1 et. seq. (1986 & Supp. 1992)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1994)
Utah Const, art. I, § 12
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
U.S. Const, amend. IV
U.S. Const, amend. VI
The text of those provisions is contained in Appendix B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In March 1992, Maestas was charged with unlawful
2

distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a
public school, a First Degree Felony offense in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as amended), and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a Third Degree Felony
offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953
as amended).

(R. 6-7.)

Maestas was represented by private

counsel during the proceedings.

(R. 25.) The case went to trial

in April 1993 (R. 42, 73), and the jury found Maestas guilty on
both charges.

(R. 69-72.)

Judgment was entered against Maestas

(R. 104-06), and the judge stayed the prison sentence and ordered
Maestas to serve probation.

(R. 138-39.)

In June 1993, private counsel filed a notice of appeal in
this case (R. 76-77), but failed to take any further action in
connection with the appeal.

In June 1994, this Court dismissed

the appeal. (R. 109; 123-24.) Thereafter, the state filed an
order to show cause why probation should not be revoked. In
September 1994 the trial court revoked probation and Maestas was
sent to prison to serve his sentence.

(R. 146-48; 152-53.)

In 1996, the trial court consolidated matters relevant to
the trial and raised in the Rule 65B proceedings with the
original criminal action.
(Case No. 950902479

Thereafter, Maestas was re-sentenced.

at 146, 154, 156-64; also R. 174-77.) In

accordance with Utah law, Maestas is appealing from the judgments
of conviction dated June 17, 1996 (R. 175-78), and attached as

3

Appendix C.
In June 1997, the court of appeals granted Maestas' Motion
pursuant to Rule 23B, see Appendix D, with Findings in the trial
court regarding ineffective assistance atttached as Appendix E.
On February 10, 2000, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions and the revocation of probation.

State v. Maestas,

2000 UT App 022, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officials from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") engaged
in a clandestine operation to determine the source of unlawful
drugs going into the Utah State Prison. (R. 368; 384.) The
officers arranged for an inmate, Tony Waldron, to make contact
with specific persons outside the facility, who officers believed
had been supplying drugs to individuals in the prison.(See R.
255; 358-59; 374.)

DOC officials had a list of four or five

suppliers who Waldron would contact. (R. 385.) Nothing in the
record supports that Maestas was on that list.
Indeed, the record supports that officials and Waldron did
not consider Maestas to be a target of the operation.
Correctional officers admitted that the operation "had nothing to
do with Maestas." (R. 239; see

also 266-68; 362-63; 385.)

Likewise, the trial judge in this case found that Maestas1
involvement in the matter was "an accidental happening." (R.
284. )

4

On the day of the transaction, Waldron made contact with two
women who were to line him up with a targeted supplier.

(R.

233.) The women attempted to make contact with the supplier by
telephone and pager, but were unsuccessful. (R. 234; 239; 36162.) Thereafter, the women indicated they may be able to buy
drugs from Maestas.(R. 234; 362-63.) Although the DOC had no
reason to involve Maestas in the matter, there was no effort to
refocus the operation to its intended purpose, and no effort to
involve local law enforcement. Rather, Waldron and the women
found Maestas, and according to evidence presented at trial,
purchased drugs. (R. 234-35; 363; 376-77.)
Thereafter, as Maestas and a second person left in Maestas'
car from the apartment where the transaction allegedly occurred,
correctional officials followed and engaged overhead lights to
pull Maestas over to the side of the road. (R. 270.)
Investigator Sundquist arrested Maestas and searched Maestas and
the car. (R. 271; 273.)

According to Sundquist, in connection

with the search, he confiscated approximately $385 in cash, a
white powdery substance, and an additional substance that
Sundquist found in Maestas1 pockets. (R. 271.)

Maestas was

charged with one count each of unlawful distribution and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.

(R. 006-007.)

The case went to trial. (See R. 295-503.)

During cross-

examination of Waldron, defense counsel failed to inquire into

5

matters impugning Waldron1s character. (R. 374-83.) Specifically,
Waldron had been convicted of several counts of forgery,
aggravated assault by a prison inmate and felony fleeing; his
history included additional forgery-related convictions; he was
suspected of smuggling drugs into the prison and had a history of
hiding drugs on his person and otherwise possessing drugs while
in the prison; he was found to have injection sites on his arm;
and Waldron was never charged or disciplined in connection with a
drug smuggling investigation that began in the prison in November
1991. (R. 784-89.)

Waldron was given a parole date of January

1993. (R. 785.) Yet, approximately two weeks after Waldron's
involvement in the alleged transaction with Maestas, Waldron was
paroled from prison.

Waldron was paroled 9 months earlier than

scheduled, on April 2, 1992. (R. 786.)
In April 1993, the jury found Maestas guilty of the offenses
as charged (R. 69, 70), and the judge stayed the prison sentence
for 36 months while Maestas served probation in the Odyssey House
program.

(R. 104-06.)

Thereafter, on June 23, 1994, Adult Probation and Parole
filed a Progress/Violation Report with the court alleging that
Maestas had "become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking
staff and personnel at Odyssey House."

(R. 110.) In response,

the court issued a warrant for Maestas1 arrest and ordered him to
show cause why probation should not be revoked.

6

(R. 112-18.)

The order to show cause alleged the following:
[D]efendant has failed to participate and comply to the
conditions set forth by the Odyssey House program, which
resulted in his removal from said program on June 23, 1994,
in violation of condition number 11.5 of the defendant's
Probation Agreement and the Court's order.
(R. 118.) At the order to show cause hearing the evidence
reflected that on "a couple of different occasions," Maestas
indicated that he wanted to kill himself.

(R. 615.) He was

placed on a suicide watch and eventually taken to the University
of Utah Hospital emergency room because of the "ideation" he had
"about hurting himself, running in the street, letting someone
run over him." (R. 616.)
The clinical director of the Odyssey House program, Tracy
Anderson, told Maestas to let him know if Maestas continued
having suicidal thoughts; if Maestas continued, he would not be
allowed to stay in the program "because [Odyssey House was] not a
psychiatric setting" and was not equipped to handle the matter.
(R. 616-19.)
Anderson acknowledged that Maestas did not violate a "hard"
rule at Odyssey House; rather, Maestas was notified that he could
not engage in "suicide gesturing" since the program was not set
up to deal with that.

(R. 624-25.)

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that
"there has been a violation of the terms of the conditions of
probation.

That violation was knowing and intentional under
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circumstances where the defendant had the ability to comply with
the Court's order on the conditions of probation.
probation will be revoked."

Therefore

(R. 653.) A copy of the trial

court's order is attached hereto as Appendix F.

An appeal and a

23B remand proceeding followed as set forth in the Statement of
the Case, supra.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY
OF THE STATE'S KEY WITNESS DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COMPETENT REPRESENTATION,
CONFRONTATION, AND A FAIR TRIAL.
Defense counsel's performance was clearly deficient in that
he failed to cross-examine the state's key witness with evidence
that had a direct impact on the witness' credibility. The court
of appeals held that defendant suffered no prejudice through this
failure, "because the informant's testimony was abundantly
corroborated . . ." State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 022, 1 15, 388
Utah Adv. Rep. 35.
The state's key witness, Tony Waldron, testified that
Maestas sold cocaine to him for $100. (R. 376-77.)

Waldron

described the transaction to correctional officers through a wire
that he was wearing, and he identified Maestas to officers as the
supplier for purposes of the arrest. (R. 377.)

During cross-

examination, counsel for the defense, Victor Gordon, failed to
introduce evidence of Waldron's criminal background, which

8

included convictions for crimes of dishonesty, and motive for
Waldron's involvement in ensuring Maestas' arrest and conviction.
Gordon likely failed to introduce the evidence because he was
unaware of it, supporting the determination that Gordon failed to
investigate the matter. Gordon's failures constitute ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, as set forth below.
Specifically, with respect to Waldron's criminal background,
Gordon failed to introduce into evidence information concerning
Waldron's crimes of dishonesty and other matters that would impeach his credibility. A copy of that portion of the trial
transcript containing Waldron's testimony is attached hereto as
Appendix G. As a result of those failures, Maestas requested
remand of this matter in order to supplement the record with
findings of fact regarding Waldron's criminal history.

(See

Appendix D hereto.)
On remand, the trial court found that Waldron's prison file
reflected the following: Waldron had been convicted of several
counts of forgery, aggravated assault by a prison inmate and
felony fleeing; his history included additional forgery-related
convictions; he was suspected of smuggling drugs into the prison
and had a history of hiding drugs on his person and otherwise
possessing drugs while in the prison; he was found to have
injection sites on his arm; and Waldron was never charged or
disciplined in connection with a drug smuggling investigation

9

that began in the prison in November 1991. (R. 784-89.)

Waldron

was given a parole date of January 1993. (R. 785.) Yet,
approximately two weeks after Waldron's involvement in the
alleged transaction with Maestas, Waldron was paroled from
prison.

Waldron was paroled 9 months earlier than scheduled, on

April 2, 1992. (R. 786.)

Waldron's history presented credibility

issues that should have been brought to the jury's attention
during the trial of this matter.
As a matter of law, failure to investigate constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.

A trial counsel's decision

not to investigate the underlying facts of a case cannot be
considered a valid tactical decision.
P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App. 1996).

State v. Huqqins, 920

Gordon's trial performance was

constitutionally deficient.
The corroboration for Tony Waldron's version of what
occurred inside the apartment consists of four witnesses: Allen,
Lucey, Gabaldon, and Sundquist, none of whom were inside the
apartment.

While Allen stated that he observed one person leave

the apartment, he could not describe the person.

Allen's

testimony does not support that Maestas remained in the apartment
and/or engaged in a transaction. (R. 402-05.)

In addition, Allen

testified that the information he overheard on the wire during
the alleged transaction was abstract and he could not remember
what was said. Allen was unable to testify that based on what he
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heard, Maestas was involved in a transaction.

(R. 403-06.)

Next, Lucey testified that he was aware that a "sale" had
gone down when Waldron "relayed" that information to him. (R.
388-89.)

Lucey did not corroborate Waldron's testimony.

Rather,

he testified that he relied on Waldron's information and descriptions to effectuate an arrest against Maestas.

(R. 388-89.)

Gabaldon's sole testimony linking Maestas to this crime and
the events in the apartment is of hearsay statements made by
Appleman.

Appleman was actively and criminally involved in drug

transactions. (R. 233-34.)

Gabaldon testified at trial as

follows: "[Appleman] came up to the car and she said - she
pointed to Tony and she says, xwell, he already sold him
cocaine.'" (R. 363.)
pointed.

(Id.)

Maestas was with another man when Appleman

The state claims Gabaldon's testimony supports a

conviction against Maestas.

Yet it is fraught with credibility

and reliability concerns.
Specifically, although no objection was made to the
testimony, it constituted hearsay, which is not reliable
evidence. State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390

(Utah 1957)

(hearsay is unreliable). Appleman's motives/credibility in
implicating others were questionable due to her drug involvement.
Gabaldon's hearsay testimony concerning Appleman's statements is
not overwhelming evidence of a transaction involving Maestas. In
addition, the testimony should have been objected to and
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excluded, leaving no corroboration from Gabaldon whatsoever.
Sundquist's corroboration lies in having seized evidence
from Maestas which purportedly support the convictions in this
case.

Yet, the seized evidence fails to support all elements of

the first degree felony offense for distributing a controlled
substance within 1000 feet of a public school.

(See R. 57

(elements instruction).)
Tony Waldron's testimony should have been disregarded
entirely by the jury, if proper impeachment had been conducted by
defendant's trial counsel.

Corroboration was insufficient.

Allen could not identify the occupants of the apartment or
remember what was said.

Lucey relied on Waldron's statement that

a transaction had taken place.

Gabaldon only offered hearsay

statements which should not have been admitted.

Sundquist's

seizure was illegal and did not independently establish the
elements of the offense for which Maestas was convicted.
In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,188 (1990), the Utah
Supreme Court considered defense counsel's failure to investigate
the availability and testimony of certain witnesses, who would
have presented information impacting on the credibility of the
state's key witness. There, the Court ruled that the information
was important because the key witness was the only person to
offer "direct evidence of defendant's guilt."

Id.

"In reviewing

this testimony, it is important to note that because it affects

12

the credibility of the only witness who gave direct evidence of
defendant's guilt, the testimony affects the 'entire evidentiary
picture.'" Id,
Likewise, in this matter, the jury's verdict might have been
different had the jury known the extent of Waldron's character
for dishonesty and the extent of his motivation to implicate
Maestas in the transaction. This court should grant certiorari
and exercise its supervisory capacity in order to reverse
defendant's conviction because of the clear departure by the
court of appeals from the norms of appellate practice.
POINT 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADDRESS
THE PLAIN ERROR OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
HEARSAY TESTIMONY SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED
UNTIL DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF.
Gabaldon's hearsay testimony regarding Appleman's statements
is the only independent corroboration of Waldron's testimony (R.
363.), yet the court of appeals did not address the failure of
trial counsel to object, because "defendant did not raise this
argument until his reply brief, which is too late."

Maestas 2000

UT App 022, n. 4, citing Burqandv v. State, 1999 Utah App. 95, n.
1, 983 P.2d 586; Utah R. App. P. 24 (c). Burqandv cites directly
to this court's opinion in Romrell v. Zions First Nat. Bank,
N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980), which states the following:
"As a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief
will not be considered on appeal ... Nevertheless, the Court, in
its discretion, may decide a case upon any points that its proper
13

disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply brief."
Bardeen v. Commander Oil Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 355, 119 P.2d 967
(1941).

This court proceeds to decide the case in Romrell on the

basis of an issue first raised in the reply brief.
The Court of Appeals gives no heed to this Court's
qualifying statement to the rule in Romrell at 395, instead
refusing to address defendant's argument.

The harm of trial

counsel's deficiency in failing to investigate and impeach Tony
Waldron is compounded by and linked to counsel's failure to
object to Gabaldon's hearsay testimony.

Testimony regarding

Appleman's statements is clearly hearsay and inadmissible, is
particularly damaging because it allegedly stems from defendant
himself, and plainly demonstrates trial counsel's ineffectiveness
and prejudice to defendant.

This court should grant certiorari

to review the court of appeals improper application of this
court's ruling in Romrell.
POINT 3. DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE
THE ISSUE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PLAIN
HEARSAY UNTIL THE REPLY BRIEF DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COMPETENT REPRESENTATION ON APPEAL.
Defendant's appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of
the improper admission of Gabaldon's hearsay testimony until the
reply brief.

Because this error formed the basis of the court of

appeals ruling on this issue, Maestas at n.4, this represents
ineffective assistance of counsel.
10, SI 10, 386 Utah Adv. 57.

State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT

This court should grant certiorari
14

to address the merits of defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims at both the trial and appellate level.
POINT 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN CREATING A FALSE IMPRESSION TO THE JURY
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
During the trial of this matter in April 1993, the
prosecutor asked Waldron if he was "presently an inmate at the
Utah State Prison/' to which Waldron responded, "Yes, I am."
374.)

(R.

The prosecutor then asked, "Directing your attention to

the 14th of March of 1992, were you an inmate on that date?"
Waldron answered, "Yes, I was."

(R. 374.)

During cross

examination, Waldron indicated that in connection with his
involvement in the undercover operation, correctional officers
promised they would write a letter of "good recommendation to the
board," and "that was it." (R. 379.)

Neither the prosecutor nor

Waldron disclosed that Waldron actually was released on parole
nine months ahead of schedule and within approximately two weeks
of his participation in the undercover operation. (R. 793). In
fact, the prosecutor's examination improperly suggested that
Waldron had not been released.

Waldron never disclosed that he

was actually paroled early, and the prosecutor allowed the
improper suggestion to go to the jury that Waldron did not
receive parole. The prosecutor specifically did not correct the
suggestion left by his examination that Waldron was in prison
from March 1992 to the date of trial.

15

"It

is

well

settled

that deliberate deception of a court and

jurors by the presentation of known false evidence cannot be
reconciled with the rudimentary demands of justice/'

Campbell v.

Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Pvle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213 (1942)) (emphasis added). "The same result obtains when
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to
go uncorrected when it appears."
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).

Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois,

Here, "the prosecution allowed a

false impression to be created at trial when the truth would have
directly impugned the veracity of its key witness."

Campbell,

594 F.2d at 8 (citing U.S. v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1243 (4th
Cir. 1976)).
The false impressions were allowed in this case

to go

uncorrected because Gordon failed to raise the matter to the
trial court's attention.

This Court should grant certiorari to

review the court of appeals decision that the prosecutor's
presentation of a false impression to the ]ury did not amount to
prosecutorial misconduct.
POINT 5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION.
The court of appeals found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation. Maestas
at f25.

This conclusion is contrary to the law and the evidence.

During the hearing on the matter, the state was required to
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provide sufficient evidence to support a willful violation of
probation.

State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990).

Tracy Anderson and Albert Nieto testified for the state.
Anderson testified that the Odyssey House program was not
equipped to deal with such mental health issues as suicidal
ideation.

(R. 618-19.)

The problems related only to the mental

health issues (R. 622-25); Maestas broke no other rules and was
able to comply with the written/specific rules of the program.
(R. 619; 621; 623-24.) Nieto admitted that Maestas also had
accurately complained about ulcers, which proved to be untreated.
(R. 629; 633-34.)
With respect to whether Maestas willfully violated a rule,
Nieto's testimony supports that he did not.

Both witnesses

acknowledged that the program could handle some level of
"suicidal ideation/7 but that if it continued, the resident would
not be allowed to participate in the program.

(R. 618-20.)

As

the evidence reflects, Nieto believed that Maestas was not
manipulative. (R. 632-33.) Simply, the Odyssey House program was
not able to treat or monitor the mental health and medical issues
presented by Maestas.
In Hodges, the defendant was placed on probation. At an
order to show cause for probation revocation, state witnesses
testified that defendant had "physical and mental problems that
interfered with his ability to effectively participate in
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treatment/7 Id. at 272.

In reversing the probation revocation,

the court stated that where defendant's failure to progress in
the program is beyond his control, probation cannot be revoked
"unless it is also found that, because of this failure, appellant
poses a present danger to others."

Id. at 277.

In this matter, the evidence presented at the order to show
cause proceeding was insufficient to support a willful violation.
Instead, the evidence supported that Maestas made bona fide
efforts to meet the conditions of his probation, but suffered
medical and mental issues that were beyond his control and not
treatable in the Odyssey House program.
Nothing in the record supports the determination that
Maestas failed to make a bona fide effort to work within the
parameters of the Odyssey House program.

In accordance with the

cases concerning probation revocation, the evidence was
insufficient to support a willful violation.

This court should

grant certiorari in its supervisory capacity to address the court
of appeals application of the facts of this case in relation to
the prior holding in Hodges.
POINT 6. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEFENDANT'S ARREST, WHICH DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW, WAS
ILLEGAL, THEREBY INVALIDATING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST.
In this matter, the trial court justified the warrantless
search as "incident to arrest."

(R. 285.) Because the state

failed to establish that the arrest was lawful, the warrantless
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search cannot be upheld.
initiated by the DOC.

This matter involved an operation

Correctional officers identified specific

persons as the offending suppliers to the prison, and organized a
drug purchase focusing on those persons in order to arrest them
and to end the trafficking. (R. 239; 266-68; 284; 362-63; 385.)
Correctional officers admitted the operation "had nothing to do
with Maestas" (R. 239; ^ee also 266-68; 362-63; 385), and the
trial judge found that Maestas1 involvement m
accidental happening."

(R. 284.)

the matter was "an

Thus, at the time that

correctional officers diverted from their intended operation,
they were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah
law.
Utah statutory law in effect in 1992 governed the DOC and
its operations outside correctional facilities.

The "duties" of

the DOC were specifically limited to management of adjudicated
offenders and the operation of correctional facilities.
64-13-10 (Supp. 1992).

U.C.A. §

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-la-l and 77-la-2

specified that a ''corrections officer" only had "'peace officer
authority" while engaged in the performance of his duties. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-la-l (Supp. 1992) and 77-la-2 (1990).
The Utah Legislature amended Utah law governing the duties
of the DOC in 1993.

Because the events giving rise to the matter

in this case occurred in 1992, the law in effect at that time is
applicable to this Court's analysis.
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See State v. Fixel, 744

P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987).
In Fixel, a Provo City police officer arranged and
participated in a drug transactions in Pleasant Grove, Utah.
Defendant argued that because the officer involved in the
transaction was outside his nurisdictional limits at the time of
the purchase, he acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Utah Supreme Court agreed
In Maestas' case,

The

Id. at 1368.

if officers had complied with Utah

statutory law, the search never would have occurred.

Under Utah

law, officers should have terminated the operation before it
exceeded statutory limits.
This Court should grant certiorari because the court of
appeals improperly applied Utah statutory and case

law in

deciding the DOCs proper authority under the 1992 statute, and
to properly address failure of trial counsel to suppress the
evidence stemming from this illegal arrest.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should grant
certiorari to review the court of appeals decision.
SUBMITTED this

day of

^2000.

Nathan D. Pace, P.C.
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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ORME, Judge:
*]l Defendant Tony R. Maestas appeals his convictions for drug
offenses, arguing, first, that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel at his jury trial, and second, that his arrest and the
search that followed were illegal because Department of
Corrections officers acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction
when they conducted an undercover operation outside the prison.
Additionally, defendant appeals the revocation of his probation,
asserting the trial court erred when it determined defendant
willfully failed to comply with the terms of his probation. We
conclude defendant has not met his burden on appeal and affirm.
BACKGROUND
*[2 Sometime in 1992, the Department of Corrections (DOC)
launched an investigation aimed at cutting off the flow of
illegal drugs into the Utah State Prison. DOC officials planned
an undercover sting operation and enlisted the aid of an inmate

1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in this case and
participated in its resolution prior to his swearing-in as a
member of the Utah Suoreme Court.

to act as a confidential informant.
prisoner out on work release, was to
outside whom DOC officials suspected
work-release inmates. Defendant was
thus not an identified target of the

The informant, posing as a
contact individuals on the
were supplying drugs to
not a suspected supplier and
sting operation.

<l3
On March 14, 1992, the informant denned a "wire," and,
accompanied by an undercover DOC officer, Teresa Gabaldcn, set
about'to contact known drug dealers Patricia Chacon and Jeanette
Appleman. Two other DOC officers, Kim Allen and Leo Lucey,
monitored the conversations broadcast via the body wire, and
observed many of the events from a surveillance van.
*U
The informant and Gabaldcn expressed to Appleman and Chacon
their interest in purchasing illegal drugs, and the women
responded by paging their supplier. The supplier still had not
responded to the page, when, sometime later, Appleman and
Gabaldcn went to a payphene to page the supplier again. As she
left, Appleman mentioned that her brother's neighbor—who
happened to be none other than defendant--could get drugs for
her. Appleman indicated she had no way to contact defendant, but
that he frequently dropped by.
*J5
While Appleman and Gabaldcn were gene, defendant did in fact
drop by, in the company cf another man. The informant told them
Gabaldcn and Appleman were cut trying to contact their supplier
because he, the informant, wanted to purchase drugs. Defendant
then displayed a small bag cf cocaine and said, "I have this
right here." The informant bought the cocaine for $100, and
defendant left the apartment.
1c
The informant then came out cf Appleman's apartment, get
into Gabaldcn's car, and gave her the cocaine he had just
purchased. Armed peace officers were notified that the sale had
been completed, and they stopped the car in which defendant was
riding and arrested him. Incident to the arrest, one of the
officers searched defendant and confiscated two separate
substances, believed to be illegal drugs, and nearly $400 in
cash.
*!?
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance within 1000 feet cf a public school, a first
degree felony in violation cf Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1991) (currently codified at § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ix) (Supp.
1999]), and possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1999). Defendant's case was tried to a jury, which found him*
guilty on both counts. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to
statutory prison terms and fines, but execution of the prison
sentences was stayed and defendant was placed on probation and
ordered to complete the Odyssey House treatment program.
*|8
Less than a month after his participation in the program
began, defendant's probation officer filed a Progress/Violatic
961831-CA

Reoort informing the trial court that defendant had "become
suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking staff and personnel
at Odyssey House." The report was prompted by defendant's
repeated suicidal "ideation" and a threat to assault his ex-wife.
Odyssey House had warned defendant that, because it was not a
psychiatric facility, defendant could not stay in the program if
his suicidal inclination continued.
1J9
Ac the hearing on the order to show cause why defendant's
probation should net be revoked, the trial court heard testimony
that defendant was capable of following the rules of Odyssey
House. The court ultimately found that defendant had violated
the conditions of his probation and that his "violation was
knowing and intentional under circumstances where the defendant
had the ability to comply with the Court's order on the
conditions of probation." Defendant's probation was revoked, and
he was ordered to serve his prison sentence.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
<]lQ Defendant raises three main issues on appeal.2 First, he
argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his jury
trial because trial counsel failed to imoeach the confidential

2. It is noteworthy, as well as atypical, that we are deciding
this appeal nearly eight years after the crime was committed. An
explanation is in order.
Defendant was charged by information on March 25, 1992, and
was tried and convicted by a jury on April 28, 1993. After
numerous continuances, he was sentenced in December of that year.
A timely notice of appeal was filed, but his appeal was dismissed
when prior counsel failed to file the required brief.
Defendant's probation was revoked in September of 1994.
Thereafter, in April of 1995, defendant, represented by new
counsel, filed a Verified Rule 653 Petition for Relief from
Conviction and Extraordinary Writ. In response, the trial court
resentenced defendant on June 17, 1996, to allow him to pursue a
direct appeal, which defendant timely did. However, nine months
into the appeal, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Utah R.
App. P. 23B, whereupon we remanded to the trial court for "entry
of findings of fact regarding appellant's claim of ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel."
An evidentiary hearing was held and the trial court entered
findings in November and December of 1997, which were filed in
this court in January of 1998. Briefing was stayed, however,
upon defendant's motion to further supplement the record. The
supplemental record was filed in November of 1998, and briefing
was finally completed in May of 1999. Oral argument was held
September 27, 1999.
961831-CA
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informant's credibility. Following our temporary remand, the
trial court held a hearing pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure and made findings of fact relevant to
defendant's claim. We defer to those factual findings, but
determine as a matter of law "whether the defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment." State v Huccrins, 920 P. 2d 1195, 1198 (Utah Ct.
Apo.), cert denied, 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 19 96). See State v
Galleccs, 967 P.2d 9^3, 975-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Ill Defendant also argues tnat evidence seized m the search
incident to his arrest snould have been suppressed because the
arrest was illegal. He argues tne arrest violated his Fourtn
Amendment rignts and exceeded tne scope of ECC's statutory
authority. Because this issue was not raised below, defendant
asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial
court committed plain error. These are questions of law, which
we review nondeferentially. See State v Simmons, 856 P 2d 614,
613 fUtan Ct. App. 1993) ("Whetner police action implicates a
fundamental violation of a defendant's rights is a question of
law, which we independently review for correctness."); State v.
Pixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (interpretation of
statute is question of law reviewed for correctness) ; Galleccs,
967 P.2d at 975-76 (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised for first time en appeal presents question of law) .
*Il2 Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred when it
revoked his pronation, finding defendant's violation of the terms
and conditions of nis probation intentional and willful. The
trial court's determinations underlying its conclusion that
defendant violated his probation are findings of fact we will not
disturo unless clearly erroneous, i.e., against tne clear weignt
of tne evidence. See State v Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utan 1991).* Moreover,
revocation of pronation is within the trial court's discretion.
See State v Arcnuleta, 812 P.2d 30, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Therefore, we view tne evidence of a probation violation m a
lignt most favoraole to tne trial court's findings and substitute
our own judgment only if the evidence is so deficient as to
render tne court's action an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. A D D . 1994 .
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Hl3 Defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right because his
trial counsel failed to investigate and impeach the credibility
of the State's key witness, the confidential informant. The
trial court held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings of
fact regarding defendant's ineffective assistance claim.
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<|14 Specifically, the trial court found that the confidential
informant had been imprisoned on multiple counts of forgery and
one count of fraud, and, while serving his sentence, had been
disciplined numerous times for using drugs and smuggling them
into the prison. A DOC assessment described the informant as an
inmate who "cannot be trusted at all." Ke was under
investigation for drug-related activities when he was asked to
carticipate in DOC's investigation. An agent of the Department
of Adult Probation and Parole was, for obvious reasons, of the
opinion that "it would net be wise to allow him to participate."
Nevertheless, the informant accepted the invitation, and,
although a DOC investigator testified he was promised nothing in
return ccher than a letter recommending that he not lose his
parole date despite a "dirty" urinalysis, he was paroled on April
2, 1992, less than one month after his participation in the
investigation and more than nine months ahead of schedule.3 The
drug-related activities for which he was under investigation
before the sting operation resulted in no prison discipline or
criminal charges.
*|15 Defendant argues defense counsel's failure to discover these
facts impugning the informant's credibility and to present them
to the jury constitutes representation so deficient as to violate
defendant's constitutional rights to competent representation and
to confront the witnesses against him. However, in addition to
shewing trial counsel made serious errors abridging his Sixth
Amendment rights, defendant must also show counsel's errors

3. In connection with this fact, defendant alleges prosecutorial
misconduct, arguing the prosecutor left the jury with the
impression that the informant had been an inmate in the Utah
State Prison continuously from the time of his participation in
the undercover operation through the time of trial. In reality,
the informant was released shortly after the investigation and,
by the time of trial, was again incarcerated on new charges.
Defendant argues the prosecutor's questioning was improper
because it concealed the fact that the informant was paroled
early, possibly as a reward for his role in the investigation.
We do not agree that the prosecutor's questioning of the
informant rose to the level of presenting false evidence and
decline to address this argument further. See State v. Carter.
776 P. 2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989} (holding that appellate court "need
not analyze and address in writing each and every argument,
issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal"). See
also id. (n[I]t is a maxim of appellate review that" the nature
and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is
largely discretionary with that court."). Cf. Reese v. Reese,
984 P.2d 937, 991 (Utah 1999) (to facilitate Supreme Court
certiorari review, court of appeals must "at the very least
identif[y] the basis for refusing to treat an issue").
961831-CA

5

prejudiced him by depriving him of a fair trial and producing a
verdict in which we have no confidence. See Strickland v.
Washington, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1S84). The
State argues that even if counsel's performance was deficient,
defendant has failed to show that trial counsel's failure to
impeach the confidential informant prejudiced him. Because the
informant's testimony was abundantly corroborated, we agree.
<IlS The informant testified as follows: On March 14, 1S92, he
and Gabaldcn attempted to contact individuals suspected of
supplying drugs to prison inmates. He entered Appieman's
apartment while Gabaldon remained in the car, and eventually
defendant and another man came to the apartment looking for
Appleman. When defendant learned that Appleman was cut trying to
contact her supplier, defendant pulled out a small bag of cocaine
and said, "I have this right here." Defendant then asked the
informant if he was a cop, and the informant answered in the
negative and told defendant he was out of prison on a home visit.
Defendant's companion then left the apartment and the informant
paid defendant S100 for the cocaine, whereupon the informant
retired to the bathroom and told the listening agents over the
wire that the transaction was complete and they should arrest
"the two Mexicans that left the apartment building." At trial,
the prosecutor shewed the informant a bag of cocaine and the
informant identified it as the same or similar to the bag he
bought from defendant.
*Il7 The key elements of the informant's testimony were
corroborated by other witnesses. First, defendant admitted that
he was in Appieman's apartment that day. Further, Officer Leo
Lucey, who was in charge of the investigation, testified that
while monitoring the informant's "wire," he heard someone ask the
informant what kind of drugs he wanted, followed by a discussion
about money and the informant's report that the transaction was
complete. Similarly, Officer Kim Allen, who was watching through
a telescope, testified he saw two men who appeared to be Hispanic
go into the apartment. Like Lucey, he heard discussion over the
wire concerning the purchase of drugs and the amount to be paid.
He testified he heard a nervous person ask the informant if he
was a cop and the informant reply that he was out of prison on a
release program. He also testified that one of the two Hispanic
men left the apartment, and, thereafter, the informant stated
over the wire that the transaction was complete and described
defendant and his car. Sure enough, when the car was stopped,
defendant had drugs and a considerable cash sum on his person.
*jl8 Gabaldon's testimony even more convincingly corroborated the
informant's version of events. She testified that when she and
Appleman returned in the car from their attempt to contact
Appieman's regular supplier from a payphone at a nearby
convenience store, they saw defendant and his companion outside
standing by a car. When Appleman saw the two men, she told
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Gabaldon, "Well, there they are now. . . . I know I can get some
stuff from them." Appleman got out of the car and approached
defendant and his companion, while Gabaldon turned the car
around. Appleman then came back to the car, gestured toward
defendant,~and said, "Well, he already sold him cocaine."4 In
addition, both Gabaldon and Officer Jeff Sundquist identified the
bag of cocaine.
<[19 We agree with the State that, even had the jury been
apprised of the facts bearing on the informant's credibility, it
would not have altogether disregarded his testimony because it
was corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses. The
failure of defendant's trial counsel to impeach the informant's
credibility, then, dees not undermine our confidence in
defendant's convictions. Having failed to show that the errors
of his trial counsel resulted in prejudice, defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
PROPRIETY OF THE DOC INVESTIGATION
*]20 We turn new to defendant's challenge to DOC's authority to
conduct the sting operation in which he was ensnared. Defendant
argues DOC lacked authority to conduct undercover investigations
outside the prison, and, in any event, should have looked the
ether way when defendant happened onto the scene because
defendant was not en the list of suspects targeted by the
investigation. He argues his arrest was illegal and that the
drugs and money seized in the search incident to the arrest
should have been suppressed. Because these arguments were not
raised at trial, defendant argues that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court
committed plain error when it did not exclude the evidence sua
spente. We disagree.
*J21 DCC may "designate by policy which of its employees have
the authority and powers of peace officers, the power to
administer oaths, and other powers the department considers
appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility to
bear firearms." Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-8 (1996)/ In 1992,
DOC-designated peace officers, as state employees, had statewide
peace officer authority. See 1937 Utah Laws ch. 69, § 9 ("Peace
officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the
authority extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when
they are acting under Chapter 9, Title 77 [, i.e., are in fresh

4. Counsel's failure to object to this testimony as hearsay was
itself claimed to be ineffective assistance of counsel, but
defendant did not raise this argument until his reply brief,
which is too late. See Buraandv v. State, 983 P.2d 586, 588 n.l
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); Utah R. A D D . P. 24(c).
96I831-CA
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oursuit.] This limitation does not apply to any peace officer
employed by the state.'1) . It is undisputed than the DOC officers
conducting the investigation in question were certified peace
officers employed by a state agency. Given DOC's broad statutory
license under section 64-13-8 to define the duties of its peace
officers, and under the jurisdictional statute then in effect,
which placed no intrastate geographic restrictions on DOC peace
officer authority, the officers in this case acted within the
scooe of their authority in pursuing the undercover
investigation. Further* their authority was net somehow limited
by their predetermined suspect list. When defendant walked into
their trao, they had every right to adjust the focus of the
investigation to account for such fortuity. Defendant was not
cre;udiced by his trial counsel's failure to raise these issues
a: trial, nor did the trial court commit error, plain or
'-**• '*^°"""w ~ ^ ^r* this recrar c.
PROBATION REVOCATION
*J22 Finally, we address defendant's challenge to the trial
court's determination that he violated the terms and conditions
of his probation by "knowing[ly] and intentional[ly] " failing to
comply with Odyssey House rules. Defendant had been told that
Odyssey House was not a psychiatric facility and could not treat
suicidal depression. He knew that he cculd not remain in the
program if he continued to express suicidal thoughts.
Nevertheless, defendant argues his failure to comply with this
standard was not knowing and intentional, but was the product of
mental illness. The trial ccurt disagreed, finding that
defendant was capable :f controlling his suicidal thoughts and
behavior ant that his probation violation was, accordingly,
knowing and
itentional. Defendant argues this z ndinc is
clearly erroneous.
*!23 A court may revoke probation if, upon M balanc[ing] the
evidence, using discretion to weigh its importance and
credibility, [it determines that] the probationer has more likely
than not violated the conditions of probation." State v. Hodaes,
795 ?.2d 270, 2 7 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . We will not disturb the
trial court's decision unless the court's findings are against
the clear weight of the evidence and the probation revocation was
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09
(Utah Ct. A p p . ) , cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
Moreover, we review the evidence before the court in a light
favorable to the court's findings. See Peterson, 8S9 P. 2d at
991; Martinez. 811 P.2d at 208."
*i24 This court has previously held that "in order for a trial
court to revoke probation based on a probation violation, the
court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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violation was willful." Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991. Accord
Hodges, 798 P. 2d at 277. However, "willful" in this context does
not mean "intentional." Peterson. 869 P.2d at 991. "[A]
finding of willfulness 'merely requires a finding that the
probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions
of his probation.'" Id. (quoting State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d
80, 84 "(Utah Ct. App. 199lf) .
<J25 At defendant's revocation hearing, the clinical director of
Odyssey House testified that defendant was capable of complying
with the rules of the program. Similarly, a program counselor
testified that defendant's suicidal "ideation" began as
manipulative behavior that escalated into a frenzy. 3ased on the
evidence before it, the trial court found a violation of
probation "[tjhat . . . was knowing and intentional under
circumstances where the defendant had the ability to comply with
the Court's order." Defendant presented no evidence whatsoever
on his own behalf. The testimony of the Odyssey House clinicians
concerning defendant's ability to control his suicidal "ideation"
was unccntroverted, and is sufficient to support the trial
court's finding of a probation violation. The court did not
abuse its discretion when it revoked defendant's probation.
CONCLUSION
*|26 We reject defendant's claims of error. Defendant was not
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to impeach the
confidential informant. DCC did not exceed the scope of its
statutory authority when it conducted the investigation outside
the prison. The trial court properly revoked defendant's
orcbaticn based on findings adecuatelv suoocrted bv the evidence.

Gregory

<l2 8

Orme, Judge

WS CONCUR:

^Judith M. Billings, Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judce
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Appendix B

CHAPTER 13
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS —
STATE PRISON
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-264 provides that Chapters 13 and 13a, the Department of Corrections, are repealed July 1, 1993.
Section
64-13-1.
64-13-2.
64-13-3.
64-13-6.
64-13-7.

Section

64-13-19.
64-13-20.

Definitions.
Creation of department.
Executive director.
Purposes of department
Offenders in custody of department.
Persons in need of mental
health services — Contracts.
Designation
of
employee
powers.
Repealed.
Department duties.
Assistance to sheriffs.
Administrators.
Secure correctional facilities.
Limits of confinement place —
Release status — Work release.
Victim notification of offender's
release.
Property of offender — Storage
and disposal.
Inmate employment.
Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspondence.
Labor at correctional facilities.
Investigative services — Pre-

64-13-1.

Definitions.

64-13-7.5.
64-13-8.
64-13-9.
64-13-10.
64-13-12.
64-13-13.
64-13-14.
64-13-14.5.
64-13-14.7.
64-13-15.
64-13-16.
64-13-17.

64-13-21.
64-13-22.
64-13-23.
64-13-24.
64-13-25.
64-13-26.
64-13-27.
64-13-28.
64-13-29.
64-13-30.
64-13-31.
64-13-32.
64-13-34.
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As used in this chapter:
(1) "Community correctional center" means a nonsecure correctional
facility operated by the department.
(2) "Correctional facility" means any facility operated fay the department to house offenders, either in a secure or nonsecure setting.
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council.
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(5) "Emergency" means any riot, disturbance, homicide, inmate violence occurring in any correctional facility, or any situation that presents
immediate danger to the safety, security, and control of the department.
(6) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Corrections.
(7) "Inmate" means amy person who is committed to the custody of the
department and who is housed at a correctional facility or at a county jail
at the request of the department.

(8) "Offender" means any person who has been convicted of a crime for
which he may be committed to the custody of the department and is at
least one of the following:
(a) committed to the custody of the department;
(b) on probation; or
(c) on parole.
(9) "Secure correctional facility" means any prison, penitentiary, or
other institution operated by the department or under contract for the
confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they
attempt to leave the institution without authorization.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 1; 1989,
ch. 224, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment added present Subsections (1), (2) and (6)
through (8), and redesignated former Subsec-

tions (1) and (2) as present Subsections (4) and
(5).
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989. added present Subsection (5) and redesignated former Subsections (5) to (8) as Subsections (6) to (9).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — State prisoner s right to personally
appear at avil trial to which he is a party—
state court cases, 32 A.LJL4th 1063.
Validity, construction, application, and ef-

feet of Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, 42 USCS §§ 1997-1997J, 93 A.L.R. Fed.
706.

64-13-2, Creation of department.
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervision of the executive director of the department. The department is the state
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the
Department of Human Services.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-Z, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 2; 1990, ch. 183, § 47.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"Human Services'' for "Social Services" at the
end of the second sentence.

64-13-3. Executive director.
(1) The executive director shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The executive director shall be experienced and knowledgeable in the
field of corrections and shall have training in criminology and penology.
(3) The governor shall establish the executive director's salary within the
salary range fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State OfEcer
Compensation.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-3, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 3; 1991, ch. 114, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1991, added Subsection
(3).

64-13-4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 64-13-4 (L. 1977, ch.
253, § 4), relating to the oath, bond and per

diem and expense allowances of board members, was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 17.

64-13-4.1. Creation of Corrections Advisory Council.
(1) There is created within the Department of Corrections a Corrections
Advisory Council consisting of seven members. Each member shall be appointed by the governor for a term of four years, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Terms of the "council members shall be staggered, with no more
than two terms expiring in any one year. Each council member shall be a
resident of the state. No more than four members may be from the same
political party and no member may hold any office connected with the Department of Corrections. A vacancy occurring on the council for any reason shall
be filled by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate for the
unexpired term of the vacated member.
(2) Membership of the council should be chosen to reflect:
(a) geographical distribution;
(b) expertise or personal experience with subject matters in the field of
corrections;
(c) diversity of opinion and political preference; and
(d) gender, cultural, and ethnic diversity.
(3) Council members may be appointed for no more than two consecutive
terms unless the governor deems an additional term is in the best interest of
the state.
(4) Council members serve in a part-time capacity and without salary, but
members shall receive a per diem allowance established by the director of the
Division of Finance and all actual and necessary expenses incurred in the
performance of official duties.
(5) A member of the council may not hold any other office in the government of the United States or of this state or of any municipal corporation
within the state.
(6) Any member may be removed at any time by the governor for official
misconduct, habitual or wilful neglect of duty, or for other good and sufficient
cause.
(7) A council member shall disclose any conflict of interest to the council
and if the conflict involves a direct or financial interest in either the subject
under consideration or an entity or asset that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of council action, the member shall refrain from voting on the
matter.
(8) Current members of the Board of Corrections shall continue in office as
members of the Corrections Advisory Council until expiration of their terms
and until their successors are chosen.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-4.1, enacted by L.
19S5, ch. 198. § 4.
Cross-References. — Governor's appointive power, Utah Const., Art. VTH, Sec. 10.

Per diem rates and
§§ 63-1-14.5, 63-1-15.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5.
Key Numbers. — Prisons *=» 4.

travel

expenses.

64-13-5. Council duties.
(1) The Corrections Advisory Council shall review and make recommendations to the executive director of the Department of Corrections concerning:
(a) the role and responsibility of the department and its programs;
(b) existing and proposed policies of the department;
(c) the annual budget request for the department prior to submission to
the governor,
(d) development and implementation of master plans for the department's programs and facilities, including facility siting;
(e) any subject deemed appropriate by the council, except the council
may not become involved in administrative matters; and
(f) any subject concerning the department, as requested by the executive director.
(2) The council shall encourage citizen awareness and input regarding programs in the field of corrections.
(3) The council shall prepare an annual report for the governor and the
Legislature on the status of the department and its programs.
(4) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any
information necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its responsibilities under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 5.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as

enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 5, creating
division of corrections, and enacts the above
section,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5.
Key Numbers. — Prisons *» 4.

64-13-6. Purposes of department
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include:
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement,
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate;
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders;
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders;
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and interests of victims, where reasonable; and
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute and
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 2.
Amendment Notes, — The 1987 amendment substituted "purposes" for "purpose" and
"include" for "includes the following" m the introductory language; inserted "of offenders" in
Subsection (1); substituted "offenders" for "the
cnminal offender for the purpose of maintaining a law-abiding and productive society" in
Subsection (2); substituted "program" for "re-

habilitation" and "for offenders'* for "to assist
the criminal offender in functioning as a lawabiding and productive member of society" in
Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (4),
which read "individualized treatment of the offender, and", redesignated former Subsection
(5) as present Subsection (4); made punctuation changes and added "and" to the end, in
Subsection (4); and added present Subsection
(5).

64-13-7, Offenders in custody of department
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state correctional facility, for
supervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to
facilities or programs.
History: C. 1953. 64-13-7, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 2; 1987. ch. 116. § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" in
the first sentence.

64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental health services —
Contracts.
(1) Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department determines that a person in its custody is in need of mental health services, the
department shall contract with the Division of Mental Health, local mental
health authorities, or the state hospital to provide mental health services for
that person. Those services may be provided at the Utah State Hospital or in
community programs provided by or under contract with the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or other public or private mental
health care providers.
(2) If the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or the
state hospital notifies the department that it is unable to provide mental
health services under Subsection (1), the department may contract with other
public or private mental health care providers to provide mental health services for persons in its custody.

History: C. 1953, 64-13-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 345, § 5; 1991, ch. 193, § 1.
Amendment Notes, — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29t 1991, added the Subsection (1) designation and added Subsection
(2); substituted TExcept as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department determines
that a person in its custody is" for Tor persons
in the custody of the department who the de-

partment has determined to be" and made a
stylistic change in the first sentence in Subsection (1); and inserted "or other public or priyate mental health care providers" and made
related changes in the second sentence in Subsection (1).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, eh. 245, § 8
^ ^ ^
makes ^
on Jui
u
i m

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJ-JL — Right of state prison authorities to
administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs

to prisoner without his or her consent—state
cases, 75 A-LJL4th 1124.

64-13-8. Designation of employee powers.
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the
authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and
other powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited
to the responsibility to bear firearms.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch- 211, § 3; 1987, ch. 116, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted the former first sentence; and

substituted "its" for "those" and "considers" for
"deems" and inserted "authority and" in the
remaining sentence.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJ-.R. — Probation officer's liability for
negligent supervision of probationer, 44
A.LR4th 538.

64-13-9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, 5 28 repeals
§ 64-13-9, as enacted by Laws 1985. ch. 211,

§ 4. relating to department services to other
agencies, effective April 27, 1987.

64-13-10. Department duties.
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, correctional facilities, community correctional centers,
and other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to accomplish its
purposes.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 5; 1987, ch. 116, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "correctionaT for "prison"

and "necessary and as required to accomplish
its purposes*' for "required for the safe managem e nt of public offenders."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Constitutional right of prisoners
to abortion services and facilities — federal
cases, 90 AJ-JL Fed. 683.

64-13-10-5, 64-13-11- Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 90, § 2 repeals
§ 64-13-10.5, as enacted by L. 1987, ch. 157,
§ 2, relating to education of persons in custody
of Department of Corrections, contracting for
services, transfer of supplies, equipment, furniture, and budget, and joint committee, effective

April 27, 1992. For present comparable provisions. see § 53A-1-403.5.
Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 64-13-11,
as enacted by Laws 1985, cfa. 211, § 6, reiaung
to evaluation programs, effective April 27,
1987.

64-13-12- Assistance to sheriffs.
Where resources permit, the department may assist county sheriffs in the
development of jail standards, in the review of jail facilities, and shall provide
other services as requested by the sheriffs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-12, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 7; 1987, ch. 116, § 6; 1988,
ch. 100, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 198/ amend6 3eCUOn m
*!£ ^ ^
? r 3Ur?se^10ns;
added vvhere resources permit to the beginning of Suosection 11), substituted "mav assist"
for "shall assist" and "in the review of jail facilities, and snail provide" for "review of facilities, and" and deleted "wnere availaoie re-

64-13-13.

sources permit" following 1)y the sheriffs" in
Subsection (1); and substituted "of for "for"
preceding "an offender" in Subsection (2)1 a).
The 1 9 8 8 amendment, effective July 1, 1990,
deleted former Subsection f 2), pertaining to re„
* L
^ u r s e m e n t or a county for the incarceration
of a feio
and
?deleted the Subsection 11) designation from the remaining paragraph,

Administrators.

The executive director shall appoint deputy directors, wardens, regional
administrators, and other administrators as necessary to administer correctional programs. Deputy directors, wardens, and regional administrators shall
have experience in corrections, related criminal justice fields, law, or criminology, and experience in administration.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-13, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 8: 1987, ch. 116, 4 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment inserted "wardens, regional admimstrators, and other admimstra tors" and made a

punctuation change in the first sentence and
deleted the former second sentence, authonzing the appointment of regional administrators
and wardens,

64-13-14. Secure correctional facilities,
CD The department shall maintain and operate secure correctional facilities for the incarceration of offenders.
For each compound of secure correctional facilities, as established by the
executive director, wardens shall be appointed as the chief administrative
officers by the executive director.
(2) The department may transfer offenders from one correctional facility to
another and may, with the consent of the sheriff, transfer any offender to a
county jail.

History: C. 1963, 64-13-14, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 9; 1987, ch. 116, § 8.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment rewrote this section.

64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — Release status
— Work release.
(1) The department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of ail
inmate when, as established by department policies and procedures, there is
cause to believe the inmate will honor his trust, by authorizing him under
prescribed conditions:
(a) to leave temporarily for purposes specified by department policies
and procedures to visit specifically designated places for a period not to
exceed 30 days:
(bj to participate in a voluntary training program in the community
while housed at a correctional facility or to work at paid employment;
(c) to be housed in a nonsecure community correctional center operated
by the department; or
(d) to be housed in any other facility under contract with the department.
(2) The department shall establish rules governing offenders on release
status. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the
rules and to notify the department of the offenders discharge or other release
from a release program activity, or of any violation of the rules governing
release status.
(3) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of
his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an institution or
facility designated by the department is an escape from custody.
(4) If an offender is arrested for the commission of a crime, the arresting
authority shall immediately notify the department of the arrest.
(5) The department may impose appropriate sanctions upon offender's who
violate rules, including prosecution for escape under Section 76-8-309 and for
unauthorized absence.
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure correctional facility and on
work release may not be required to work for less than the current federally
established minimum wage, or under substandard working conditions.
History: C. 1953. 64-13-14.3, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 116, § 9.

64-13-14,7. Victim notification of offender's release.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Offender" means a person who committed an act of criminally
injurious conduct against the victim and has been sentenced to incarceration in the custody of the department.
(b) frVictim" means a person against whom an offender committed
criminally injurious conduct as defined in Section 63-63-2, and who is
entitled to notice of hearings regarding the offender's parole under Section 77-27-9.5. "Vict im' includes the legal guardian of a victim, or the
representative of the family of a victim who is deceased.

(2) (a) A victim shall be notified of an offender's release under Section
64-13-14.5, or any other release to or from a half-way house, to a program
outside of the prison such as a rehabilitation program, state hospital,
community center other than a release on parole, commutation or termination for which notice is provided under Section 77-27-9.5, transfer of
the offender to an out-of-state facility, or an offender's escape, upon submitting a signed written request of notification to the Department of
Corrections. The request shall include a current mailing address and may
include current telephone numbers if the victim chooses
(b) The department shall advise the victim of an offender's release or
escape under Subsection (2)(a), in writing. However, if written notice is
not feasible because the release is immediate or the offender escapes, the
department shall make a reasonable attempt to notify the victim by telephone if the victim has provided a telephone number under Subsection
(2)(a) and shall follow up with a written notice
(3) Notice of victim rights under tins section shall be provided to the victim
m the notice of hearings regarding parole under Section 77-27-9 5. The department shall coordinate with the Board of Pardons to ensure the notice is
implemented
(4) A victim's request for notification under tins section and any notification to a victim under tins section is private information that the department
may not release
(a) to the offender under any circumstances: or
(b) to any other party without the written consent of the victim.
(5) The department may make rules as necessary to implement this section.
(6) The department or its employees acting within the scope of their employment are not civilly or criminally liable for failure to provide notice or
improper notice under tins secuon unless the failure or impropriety is willful
or grossly negligent
Historv- C. 1953, 64-13-14.7, enacted by L.
1991. ch.' 11. 5 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 11 be-

came effective on April 29 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

64-13-15. Property of offender — Storage and disposal.
(1) (a) Offenders may retain personal property at correctional facilities
only as authorized by the department An offender's property which is
retained by the department snail be inventoried and placed in storage by
the department and a receipt for the property shall be issued to the offender Offenders shall be required to arrange for disposal of property
retained by the department within a reasonable time under department
rules Property retained by the department shall be returned to the offender at discharge, or m accordance with Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate
Code, m the case of death prior to discharge
(b) If property is not claimed within one year of discharge, or it is not
disposed of by the offender within a reasonable time after the department's order to arrange for disDosal, it becomes property of the state and
may be used for correctional purposes or donated to a charity within the
state
(c* If an inmate s property is not claimed within one year of his death,
it becomes the property of the state in accordance with Section 75-2-105.

(d) Funds which are contraband and in the physical custody of any
prisoner, whether in the form of currency and coin which are legal tender
in any jurisdiction or negotiable instruments drawn upon a personal or
business account, shall be subject to forfeiture following a hearing which
accords with prevailing standards of due process. All such forfeited funds
shall be used by the department for purposes which promote the general
welfare of prisoners in the custody of the department. Money and negotiable instruments taken from offenders' mail under department rule and
which are not otherwise contraband shall be placed in an account administered by the department, to the credit of the offender who owns the
money or negotiable instruments.
(2) Upon discharge from a secure correctional facility, the department may
give an inmate transition funds in an amount established by the department
with the approval of the director of the Division of Finance. At its discretion,
the department may spend the funds directly on the purchase of necessities or
transportation for the discharged inmate.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-15, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211. § 10: 1987, ch. 116, § 10; 1988,
ch. 191, § 1; 1991, ch. 124, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in SuDsection 11), substituted references
to "offender" for references to "inmate"
througnout the subsection, substituted "personai prooerty at correctional facilities only as
authorized" for "property only as is authorized"
m the first sentence, made a punctuation
change in the third sentence, substituted ''one
year* for "two years" and "and may be used for
correctional purposes or donated to a chanty
within the state" for "consistent with the provisions of Chapter 44. Title 78" m the fourth sentence, and rewrote the last sentence: in Subsection (2). substituted "a secure correctional facility, the department may give an inmate" for
"prison, inmates shall receive" in the first sentence, substituted 'its discretion, the department may spend the funds" for "the discretion
of the department, the funds may be spent'* in
the second sentence, and addea 'for the discharged inmate' to the end of the subsection.
The 1988 amendment, effective Apnl 25,
1988, in Subsection (I) divided the subsection

into the present paragraphs and added the designations: in Subsection (lKaj, inserted the
third sentence and, in the fourth sentence, substituted at the beginning "Property retained by
the department" for "The property": in Subsection t l)(b», inserted "or it is not disposed of by
the offender within a reasonable time", and, m
Subsection (l)iof deleted "held by the department" following "instruments" at the end of
the subsection.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991. substituted "shall be required" for "may
be required" in the third sentence and "in accordance with Title 75. Utah Uniform Probate
Code" for "to the offenders legal representative" in the fourth sentence m Subsection
(l)(a); deleted "death or" after "year or and
inserted 'after the department's order to arrange for disDosar in Subsection (1Kb); and
added present Subsection (l)(c) and the first
two sentences in Subsection (l)(d) making former Suosection (lKc) the final sentence in Subsection • l)(d) and substituting "offenders' mail
under department rule and which are not otherwise contraband" for "offenders or from their
mail under department rule" therein.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison
regulation of inmates' possession of personal
prooerty, 66 A.L R.4th 300.

64-13-16. Inmate employment
Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity or
for security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree that
funding and available resources allow An offender may not be employed on
work which benefits any employee or officer of the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 11; 1987, ch. 116, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted 'the aepartment may employ
inmates to the degree that funding and available resources allow' for "* inmates shall be em-

ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at
the end of the first sentence, substituted "An
offenaer may nor/' for ''No inmate may" at the
beginning of the second sentence, and deleted
the former third, fourth, and last sentences.

64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspondence,
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general, judges of the
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advisory Council: members of the Board of Pardons: members of the Legislature, and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the
department or court order
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with
any inmate without the consent of the department.
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a not or
other disturoance
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility,
other than under Subsection ( 1 \ without the consent of the department. Offenders and all visitors may be required to suomit to a search or inspection of
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation.
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive correspondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is
suDject to search, consistent with department rules.
History* C. 1953. 64-13-17, enacted bv L.
1985. ch." 211. § 12: 1987. ch. 116. * 12.
Amendment .Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided Simsection (l into present Suosections <b(a) and 1(b) ana added present
Sunsection <l)(c> in Subsection l;(a) suostitutea "correctional" for 'state prison" near the
beginning of the suosection. in Suosection (2),
substituted *A oerson mav not' for "No person
may' "oifenaer at any correctional facility" for

"inmate" and "under* for "those provided for
in' m the first sentence, substituted "Offenaers * for Inmates * and deleted "exercising"
preceaing "visitation * in the second sentence,
and aeieted the former third sentence as set
out in the oound volume, and, in Subsection
(3) suostituted "Offenders housed at any correctional facility' for Inmates" in the first
sentence

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Vanaitv and construction of prison
regulation of inmates possession or personal
proDertv 66 -V L R 4th 300

64-13-18. Sentence of incarceration.
The officer delivering any offender for incarceration shall deliver to the
department a certified copy of the sentence received by the officer firom the
clerk of the court. The department shall give the officer a certificate of delivery and shall submit to the Board of Pardons a copy of the commitment order.
The certified copy of sentence is conclusive evidence of the facts contained in
it.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-18, enacted by L.
1985, chu 211, § 13.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
en. 211, § 13 repeals former § 64-13-18, as
enacted by Laws 1977. en. 253, § 18, relating

to repair of damaged property, and enacts the
above section.
Cross-References. Pardons and paroles,
Chapter 27 of Title 77.

64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities.
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be
made for the laoor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or supplies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods,
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 211, § 14: 1987, ch. 116, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "correctional facilities" for

"the prisons'' at the end of the first sentence
and "offenders" for "inmates" in the second and
third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the
third sentence

64-13-20- Investigative services — Presentence investigations and diagnostic evaluations.
(1) The department shall.
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports
to.
(l) assist the courts in sentencing;
(u) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities regarding offenders,
(in; assist the department m managing offenders; and
(IVJ assure the professional and accountable management of the
department,
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic services based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases;
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting*
d) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders;
(u) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons;
and
(mj thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under
Section 76-3-404
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate
measures to be taken regarding offenders
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports
prepared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1
and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or
by rules made by the Department of Corrections
(b) The reports are intended only for use by
d) the court in the sentencing process,
(n) the Board of Pardons m its decision-making responsibilities;
and
(in; the deoartment in the supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be
made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state if

the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being
evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of probation or parole.
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact
statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant
caused bodily harm or death to the victim.
(b) Victim impact statements shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense;
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered
by the victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and
permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or
otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section, the
information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or
family members, as necessary.
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of
complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of
corrections programs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 15; 1987, ch. 116, $ 14; 1991,
ch. 206, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment redesignated Subsections il) through (3)
as present Suosections il)(a> through U)(c/,
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (l)<d)
througn (l)(f), and Subsection <5J as present
Subsection (2), resoectively, designated the former introductory language as the introductory
language of present Suosection (1); substituted
"investigative services" for "investigative functions/ ""to assist" for "'functions, and" preceding "the Board of Pardons" and "offenders" for
"the offender* and inserted "to assist" preceding "the department" in the introductory language of Subsection (1): deleted "subject to the
limitations of Suosection 64-13-15 <D" from
the end of the first sentence of Subsection
(1Kb), substituted 'regarding'' for "on behaif
of in the second sentence of Subsection (1Kb);
deleted the former third sentence of Subsection
(1Kb) as set out m the bouna volume; rewrote

Suosection (l)(c): deleted "the defendant, his
attorney, the state's attorney, and" preceding
"other correctional programs" in Subsection
(l)(d); redesignated Subsections (4)(ai through
(4)(f) as present Subsections (D(eKi) through
(D(eKvi); substituted "and" for "along with" in
Subsection 'D(etfiii).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, rewrote Subsection (1) as Suosections (1)
through (6), adding or changing the subsection
designations, adding Suosections f l)(c)(iii) and
(3)(b), inserting references to "diagnostic services" in Subsections <!)(ai and (l)(b), inserting
references to "presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports" in Suosections
(3)(a) and i4), suostitutmg the language beginning with "as denned" in Subsection (3)(a) for
"under Chapter 2, Title 63, regarding information practices." and making several stylistic
changes throughout Subsections (I) through
(6). and redesignated Suosection (2) as Subsection <7).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296
(Utah CL App. 1989).

64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in
community.
The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sentenced offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on parole by the Board of Pardons, or upon acceptance for supervision under the
terms of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers. Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the
department, giving priority, based on available resources, to felony offenders.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 16; 1987, ch. 116, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment rewrote the first sentence and made a
minor phraseology change in the second sentence.

64-13-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals
§ 64-13-22, as enacted by Laws 1985. ch. 211,

§ 17, relating to community-based programs,
effective April 27, 1987.

64-13-23. Offender's income and finances.
The department may require each offender, while in the custody of the
department or while on probation or parole, to place funds received or earned
by him from any source into an account administered by the department or
into a joint account with the department at a federally insured financial
institution.
(1) The department may require each offender to maintain a minimum
balance in either or both accounts for the particular offender's use upon
discharge from the custody of the department or upon completion of parole or probation.
(2) If the funds are placed in a joint account at a federally insured
financial institution:
la) any interest accrues to the benefit of the offender account; and
(b) the department may require that the signatures of both the
offender and a departmental representative be submitted to the financial institution to withdraw funds from the account.
(3) If the funds are placed in an account administered by the department, the department may by rule designate a certain portion of the
offender's funds as interest-bearing savings, and another portion as noninterest-bearing to be used for day-to-day expenses.
(4) The department may withhold part of the offender's funds in either
account for expenses of incarceration, supervision, or treatment: for courtordered restitution, reparation, fines, alimony, support payments or similar court-ordered payments; for department-ordered restitution; and for
any other debt to the state.
(5) (a) Offenders shall not be granted free process in civil actions, including petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, if, at any time from the

date the cause of action arose through the date the cause of action
remains pending, there are any funds in either account which have
not been withheld or are not subject to withholding under Subsection
(3) or (4).
(b) The amount assessed for the filing fee, service of process and
other fees and costs shall not exceed the total amount of funds the
offender has in excess of the indigence threshold established by the
department but not less than S25 including the withholdings under
Subsection (3) or (4) during the identified period of time.
(c) The amounts assessed shall not exceed the regular fees and
costs provided by law.
(6) The department may disclose information on offender accounts to
the Office of Recovery Services and other appropriate state agencies.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-23, enacted by L.
1987, ch- 116, § 16; 1991, en. 125, § 1; 1992,
ch. 217, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987,
ch. 116, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-23, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211. § 18, relanng to
compensation for inmate employment, and
enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment. effective Apni 29, 1991. inserted "while
m the custody of the department or while on
probation or parole" and suDsntuted "funds re-

ceived or earned by him from any source" for
"his income from employment while in the custody of the department or while on probation or
parole" in the introductory paragraph and deleted "in its discretion" after "department
may" m Subsection (5).
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992. inserted "the funds are" after "IT* in Subsections i2) and (3); made a stylistic cnange in
Subsection (4); added Subsection (5); and redesignatec former Subsection t5) as Subsection
(6).

64-13-24. Standards for staff training.
To assure the safe and professional operation of correctional programs, the
department shall establish policies setting minimum standards for the basic
training of all staff upon employment, and the subsequent regular training of
staff. The training standards of correctional officers who are designated as
peace officers shall be not less than those established by the Peace Officer
Standards and Training Council.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-24, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 19: 1987, ch- 116, § 17.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "staff upon employment" for
"newly employed staff." inserted "suDsequent."

and made a punctuation change in the first
sentence, and inserted "correctional officers
wno are designated as" and substituted "shall
be not" for "may not be' in the second sentence,

64-13-25- Standards for programs.
(1) To promote accountability and to ensure safe and professional operation
of correctional programs, the department shall establish minimum standards
for the organization and operation of its programs.
(a) The standards shall be promulgated according to state rulemaking
provisions. Those standards that apply to offenders are exempt from the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a. the Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act. Offenders are not a class of persons under that act.
(b) Standards shall provide for inquiring into and processing offender
complaints.

(2) There shall be an audit for compliance with standards according to
policies and procedures established by the department, for continued operation of correctional programs.
(a) At least every three years, the department shall internally audit all
programs for compliance with established standards.
(b) All financial statements and accounts of the department shall be
reviewed during the audit. Written review shall be provided to the managers of the programs and the executive director of the department.
(c) The reports shall be classified as confidential internal working papers and access is available at the discretion of the executive director or
the governor, or upon court order.
History: C. 1953, S4-13-25, enacted by L.
1985, ciL 211, § 20; 1987, ch- 116, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "its" for "the" near the end off
the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1);»
deleted "and shall encompass all aspects of the1
department operations" from the end of thefirst sentence of Subsection (IMSLK added the•
second sentence of Subsection fl)(aj; deleted "aL
means of* preceding "inquiring" in Subsection,
(l)(br, substituted "There snail be an audit for"
for "Certification of and a comma for "is re-

quired" in the introductory paragraph of Subsection (2); substituted "three years" for "two
years" and "for compliance" for "and certify
compliance or noncompliance" in Subsection
(2)(a); substituted "available at the discretion
of the executive director or the governor, or
upon court order" for "governed by the State
Information Practices Act" in Subsection (2)(c;;
and deleted former Subsection (2)(d), denying
certification to programs not complying with
standards.

64-13-26. Private providers of services.
(1) The department may contract with private providers or other agencies
for the provision of care, treatment, and supervision of offenders committed to
the care and custody of the department.
(2) la) The department shall:
(i) establish standards for the operation of the programs; and
(ii) annually review the programs for compliance.
(b) The reviews shall be classified as confidential internal working
papers.
(c) Access to records regarding the reviews is available upon the discretion of the executive director or the governor, or upon court order.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-26, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 21; 1987. ch- 116, § 19; 1989,
ch. 224, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "The department may contract" for "Nothing in this chapter prohibits
the department from contracting" and "reviewed for compliance with standards set by
the department" for "certified u> be m compliance with the departmental standards" in the
first sentence, added "and annually thereafter"
to the end of the first sentence, and added the
second and third sentences.

The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, designated the first sentence as present
Subsection (1); deleted "if the programs are reviewed for compliance with standards set by
the department within six months after commencing operation and annually thereafter" at
the end of Subsection (1); added Subsection
(2)(ar, designated the former second sentence of
the section as Subsection t2)(b); and designated
the former third sentence of the section as Subsection (2)(o and inserted "to records regarding the reviews" therein.

64-13-27. Records — Access,
(1) (a) The State Bureau of Criminal Identification, county attorneys' offices, and state and local law enforcement agencies shall furnish to the
department upon request a copy of records of any person arrested in this
state.
(b) The department shall maintain centralized files on all offenders
under the jurisdiction of the department and make the files available for
review by other criminal justice agencies upon request in cases where
offenders are the subject of active investigations.
(2) All records maintained by programs under contract to the department
providing services to public offenders are the property of the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-27, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 22; 1987, ch. 116, § 20; 1989,
ch. 224, § 3.
from
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted "public'' preceding "offenders" in
the second sentence of Subsection (2).
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989. aesignated the first and second sentences
of Subsection (1) as Subsections (1)(a) and lb)

and, in Subsection (2), deleted "and shall be
returned to it when the offender is terminated
the program" at the end of the present
provision and a second sentence that read T h e
department shall maintain an accurate audit
Tecord
o f information provided to other pro^ ^ or
l e s r e g a r d i n g offenders under
-^ impaction "

64-13-28. Hearings involving staff or offenders.
(1) The department shall maintain an administrative hearing office to con* duct hearings regarding offenders in the custody of the department, issues
involving staff, or any other administrative matters as assigned by the executive director of the Department of Corrections. The hearing officer may issue
subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documents, administer oaths, and take testimony under oath.
(2) The hearing officer shall maintain a summary record of all hearings and
provide timely written notice to participants of the decision and the reasons
for the decision.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-28, enacted by L.
1985, ch- 211. § 23; 1987, ch. 116, § 21; 1988,
ch- 191, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "may issue" for "shall be appointed by the executive director and has the
power to issue" in the second sentence.
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,
1988, divided the former provisions into
present Subsection ll) and Subsection (2): in

the first sentence of Subsection (1), substituted
hearings regarding offenders in the custody of
the department, issues involving staff, or any
other administrative matters as assigned by
the executive director of the Department of
Corrections" for "investigative hearings regarding offenders under supervision, staff matters in dispute, or other administrative matters in dispute"; and, in Subsection (2), inserted "timely."

64-13-29- Violation of parole or probation — Detention —
Hearing.
(1) The department shall ensure that the court is notified of violations of
the terms and conditions of probation in the case of probationers under the
department's supervision, or the Board of Pardons in the case of parolees
under the department's supervision. In cases where the department desires to
detain an offender alleged to have violated his parole or probation and where

it is unlikely that the Board of Pardons or court will conduct a hearing within
a reasonable time to determine if the offender has violated his conditions of
parole or probation, the department shall hold an administrative hearing
within a reasonable time, unless the hearing is waived by the parolee or
probationer, to determine if there is probaDle cause to believe that a violation
has occurred. If there is a conviction for a crime based on the same charges as
the probation or parole violation, or a finding by a federal or state court that
there is probable cause to believe that an offender has committed a crime
based on the same charges as the probation or parole violation, the department need not hold its administrative hearing
(2) The appropriate officer or officers of the department shall, as soon as
practical following the department's administrative hearing, report to the
court or the Board of Pardons, furnishing a summary of the hearing, and may
make recommendations regarding the disposition to be made of the parolee or
probationer Pending any proceeding under this section, the department may
take custody of and detain the parolee or probationer involved for a period not
to exceed 72 hours excluding weekends and holidays.
(3) If the hearing officer determines that there is probable cause to believe
that the offender has violated the conditions of his parole or probation, the
department may detain the offender for a reasonable period of time after the
hearing or waiver, as necessary to arrange for the incarceration of the offender Written order of the department is sufficient authorization for any
peace officer to incarcerate the offender The department may promulgate
rules for the implementation of this section
History: C. 1953, 64-13-29, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 24: 1987, cix. 116,^ 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided the section into suDsections, substitutec "violations" for Tanv violation," fprobation' for 'supervision/ "prooationers under
the deoarnnent a tor prooation offenders underprtDoation and paroiees under the deoartment s tor offenders under parole in the tirst
sentence of Suosection 1. substituted the Ianguage beginning Tn cases wnere the department desires' and ending "his conditions of parole or pronation * for Trior to giving anv notificanon' and "proDable cause" for reasonable
cause' in the second sentence of Suosection (1)
added the third sentence of Suosection 11), substituted 'the department s administrative
nealing" for "termination of anv hearing'* and
"mav mane* for fmaking" in the first sentence
of Subsection (2) substituted "under* for "pur

suant to' ana deleted "prior to the hearing"
following "holidays' in the second sentence of
Subsection (2) substituted 'the hearing officer
determines that there is probable cause to bei i e v e ^ ±e offender aas violated the condia o n s o f ^ D a r m e o r p r o b a t l o I L ±e department
^
m a v a e c a i n che offender» for -lt a p p e a r s *
^ ^
h
o f f i c e r Qr o f f i c e r s ^
Qr
,, , „ -„
,
k,
reinca
™^°*
* i ^ y to follow the oaroiee
or probationer may be detained and tncarcera n o n of
the ^offender for retaking or
reincarceration in the first sentence of Sub^ecaon 3) ^ substituted "incarcerate the offender" for "effect retaking or reincarceration"
m
^ e second sentence of Suosection (3), and
subsatuted "may promulgate rules" for "is anthonzed to Dromulgate appropnate policies
and procedures" in the last sentence of Subsection (3)

64-13-30- Expenses incurred by offenders — Payment to
department,
(1) The department shall establish and collect from offenders on work release programs reasonable costs of maintenance transportation, and incidental expenses incurred oy the deDartment on behalf of the offenders Priority
shall be given to restitution and family support obligations.
(2) The department, under its rules, may advance funds to any offender as
necessary to establish the offender m a work release program.

History: C. 1963, 64-13-30, enacted by L.
1985, cn~ 211, § 25; 1987, cJbu 116, § 23.
Amendment Notes- — The 1987 amendment deleted the second sentence of Subsection

(1) and substituted "its rules'9 for "rules it prescribes" and made a punctuation change in
Subsection (2).

64-13-31. Emergencies.
In the case of riots, disturbances, or other emergencies at correctional facilities, the Department of Corrections has authority to direct the resolution of
the emergencies. The department may request and coordinate the assistance
of other state and local agencies in responding to the emergencies.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-31, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 26; 1987, ch. 116, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted n at" for "in" preceding "correctional facilities" in the first sentence.

64-13-32. Discipline of offenders — Use of force.
If an offender offers violence to an officer or other employee of the Department of Corrections, or to another offender, or to any other person; attempts to
damage or damages any corrections property; attempts to escape: or resists or
refuses to obey any lawful and reasonable command; the officers and other
employees of the department may use all reasonable means, including the use
of weapons, to defend themselves and department property and to enforce the
observance of discipline and prevent escapes. An inmate in the act of escaping
from a secure correctional facility is presumptive evidence that he poses a
threat of death or serious bodily injury to an officer or others if apprehension
is delayed.
History: C. 1963, 64-13-32, enacted by L. ment substituted "offender, or to any" for "in1985, en. 211, § 27; 1987, ch- 116, § 25.
mate or" and made punctuation changes in the
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- first sentence and added the second sentence.

64-13-33- Restitution for offensesFollowing an administrative hearing, the department is authorized to require restitution from an ofiFender for expenses incurred by the department as
a result of the offender's violation of department rules. The department is
authorized to require payment from the offender's accoimt or to place a hold
on it to secure compliance with this section.
History: C. 1963, 64-13-33, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, 3 28.

64-13-34. Safety of offenders.
In case of disaster or acts of God that threaten the safety of inmates or the
security of a secure correctional facility, inmates may be moved to a suitable
place of security. Inmates shall be returned to a correctional facility as soon as
it is practicable.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-34, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 29; 1987, ch. 116, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted ''a secure correctional facility" for ""the prison" and deleted ""where those

who are ill shall receive necessary medical care
and attention" following "place of security" in
the first sentence; and substituted ,fa correctional facility" for "the prison*' and "practicable" for "safe" in the second sentence.

64-13-35. Items prohibited in correctional facilities — Penalties.
(1) Except as provided by department policy, no firearm, dangerous
weapon, implement of escape, explosive, drug, spirituous or fermented liquor,
medicine, or poison may be:
(a) transported to or upon a correctional facility or its appurtenant
grounds;

(b) sold or given away at any correctional facility or in any building
appurtenant to a secure correctional facility, or on land granted to the
state for the use and benefit of the department; or
(c) given to, or used by, any offender at a correctional facility.
(2) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional facility or its
appurtenant grounds any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, with intent to provide or sell it to any offender, is
guilty of a second degree felony.
(b) Any person who provides or sells to any offender at a correctional
facility any firearm, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, is guilty of a second degree felony.
(c) Any offender who possesses at a correctional facility any firearm,
dangerous weapon, implement of escape, or explosive, is guilty of a second
degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "drug" means any chemical or physical substance in any of its physical or chemical states as defined in the Controlled
Substances Act.
(4) Penalties for drug violations under this section are as provided in Section 58-37-3, Controlled Substances Act.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-35, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 30; 1987, ch. 116, § 27; 1990.
ch. 238, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "by department policy, no
firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive" for "in
Subsection (2), no" and made a punctuation
change in the introductory language of Sudsection (1); substituted a correctional facility or
..
_
• . . , « ,
its appurtenant grounds tor corrections
premises" in Subsection ,l)(a>; substituted "at
any correctional facility for "in any prison",

"secure correctional facility" for "prison." and
"the department" for "prisons" in Subsection
(l)(b>; substituted "offender at a correctional
facility" for "inmate in the prison except under
direction of department medical authorities" in
Subsection (l)(c:; and rewrote Subsection (2).
T h e 1 9 9 0 amendment, effective April 23.
1 9 9 0 i n s e n e d ^JDDlment
o f e s c a D e * though.
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64-13-36. Testing of prisoners for AIDS and HIV infection
— Segregation — Medical care — Department authority.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) ''Prisoner" means a person who has been adjudicated and found
guilty of a criminal offense, who is in the custody of and under the jurisdiction of the department.
(b) "Test" or "testing" means a test or tests for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in accordance with standards recommended by the Department of Health.
(2) (a) Within 90 days after July 1, 1989," the effective date of this act, the
department shall test or provide for testing of all prisoners who are under
the jurisdiction of the department, and subsequently test or provide for
testing of all prisoners who are committed to the jurisdiction of the department upon admission or within a reasonable period after admission.
(b) At the time that test results are provided to persons tested, the
department shall provide education and counseling regarding Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.

(3> (a) The results of tests conducted under Subsection (2) shall become
part of the inmate's medical file, accessible only to persons designated by
the department by rule, and in accordance with any other legal requirement for reporting of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human
Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
(b) Medical and epidemiological information regarding results of tests
conducted under Subsection (2) shall be provided to the Department of
Health.
(4) (a) The department shall house prisoners who test positive for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in a single cell or room or provide for segregation of that person from
members of the prison population. No person who tests negative for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus
infection may be placed or housed in a cell or room with a person who has
tested positive for either of those conditions, except upon his written
request.
(b) The department shall provide reasonable and adequate medical
care for members of the prison population who test positive for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
(o The department has authority to take action with regard to any
prisoner who has tested positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection, as it deems reasonable and necessary for the safety and security of the prison population
and prison staff.
(d) This subsection does not require or suggest that prisoners who test
positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection be placed in separate cell blocks or cell areas
separate from the general prison population, unless such separation is
medically necessary for the protection of the general prison population or
staff.
(ej Prisoners who test positive for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection may not be excluded
from common areas of the prison that are accessible to other prisoners,
solely on the basis of that condition, unless it is medically necessary for
protection of the general prison population or staff.
(5) If the department complies with Subsections (2), (3), and (4) it shall be
considered to have discharged its duty and to have taken reasonable and
necessary precautions to prevent transmission of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-36, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 234, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, cfa. 234, § 2
makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Health Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 261.

77-18-1

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section
of order — Redaction — Receipt
of order — Administrative proceedings — Division requirements.

Section
77-18-15.
77-18-16.
77-18-17.

Retention of expunged records —
Fee — Agencies.
Penalty.
Retroactive application.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the Department of Corrections.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and
presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the
department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the Department
of Corrections.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
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(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections
regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the
defendant.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
Department of Corrections.
(6) The Department of Corrections shall make the presentence investigation
report available for review at the court ten days in advance of sentencing and
shall mail or deliver copies to the defendant, defendant's attorney, and
prosecutor ten days in advance of sentencing. Any inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and
Department of Corrections prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the
attention of the sentencing judge, and a determination of relevance or accuracy
shall be made by the judge on the record. If a party fails to raise an objection
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
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(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(9) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the
court, for the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the
court orders supervised probation by the department.
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the
clerk of the court.
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide
notice of the order to the parties.
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding
fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
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(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful
and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
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condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection.
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified private in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 1,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; or
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994,
ch. 230, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, added Subsection (11).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 66, effective
April 29, 1991, in present Subsection (2)(a)
substituted "guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no
contest" for "guilty or no contest" in the first
sentence.
The 1991 amendment by ch. 206, effective
April 29, 1991, added present Subsection (1),
redesignating the following subsections accordingly; subdivided Subsections (2)(b), (3), (5Xa),
(7), (8Xa), (9Xa), and (10); substituted "appropriations subcommittee" for "appropriations
committee" at the end of Subsection (3Xe);
substituted the language beginning with "presentence" and ending with "court order" for
"report are confidential and not available except" m Subsection (5XaXiii); inserted "evidence" in the first and second sentences of
Subsection (5)(b); added Subsections (5Xc) and
(13); and made several punctuation and stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 1992 amendment, effective Apnl 27,
1992, added "including the community service
program provided m Section 78-11-20.7" to the

end of Subsection (6Xg).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective May
3. 1993, added Subsection (2) and redesignated
former Subsections (2) through (13) as Subsections (3) through (14).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective
May 3, 1993. added "and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21" in present Subsection (8), substituted "owes" for "has" and "or
other assessed costs" for "owing" and added
"and other amounts outstanding" in present
Subsection (9XaXii), substituted "and other
amounts outstanding" for "orders" in present
Subsection (9)(b), and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 13, effective May
2, 1994 substituted "Board of Pardons and
Parole" for "Board of Pardons" m Subsections
(l)(c) and (4)(b); substituted "Title 77, Chapter
2a, Pleas m Abeyance" for "Sections 77-2a-l
through 77-2a-4" in Subsection (2); substituted
"Subsection (4)(a)" for "Subsection (a)" m Subsection (4)(d); and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 198, effective
May 2, 1994, added Subsection (6XaXii), renumbering former Subsections (6)(aXii) and
(iii; as (iii) and dvj, and made a stylistic change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 230, effective
May 2, 1994, deleted former Subsection (1)
which defined "confidential"; inserted "and Parole" m Subsection (3Xb); added Subsection (6);
designated former Subsection (6)(b) as Subsection (7); deleted former Subsection (6X0 pertaining to the disposition of the presentence
investigation report after the sentencing; deleted former Subsection (14), relating to disclosure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and
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Sec. 12, [Bights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
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FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Julia CAIesandro
Clerk of the Court

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 960831-CA
v.
Tony R. Maestas,
Defendant and Aooellant.

Before Judges Davis, Wilkins, and Jackson.
This matter is before the court on a Motion for Remand for
Supplementation of the Record and for Determination of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, pursuant to Rule 23B of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded
to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with Rule 23B of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and entry of findings of
fact regarding appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel.
/
Dated this +'^T day of June, 1997,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that on June 24, 1997, a true and correct ::.<py
cf the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a personal
representative cf the Legal Defender's Office to be de* ^p^--> i
the party listed below:
Lynn R. Brown
Rebecca C. Hyde
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 E. 500 S., #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84.111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's
Office to be delivered to the party listed below:
James H. 3eadles
Assistant Attorney General
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0354
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was depcs: ted
in the United States ma: 1 to the tri a1 court ] i sted below:
Honorable William A. Thorne
Third District Court
24C E. 400 S.
Salt Lake City, UT"84111
Third District Court
Attn: Suzie Carlson
240 E. 400 S.
Salt Lake City, UT a 4. .. .1

OUif. .1.)
;eoutv C^erx:
Case No. 9608 31
Third District, Salt Lake Dept., Div. I

#921901600
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-IF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I

STATF OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff,
v.
T G . N . MAESTAS,

Case No. 921901600FS
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE

Defendant

On Octobei •,, . ^97, an Evidential Hearing was held in the above-entitled
matter pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. \- „

;.• - h e purpose of entering hndiniih ul

l: .HI ( iele.fv::iii1 lii Appellant1'.", rlaim ml' irifffprtivp assistance of counsel. Both parties were
presenl

Pursuant to Rule 23B(e). Utah R. App Pro and based upon the evidence

presented by Appellant, [hit;, \ uuu eiueiij Lr«
i .=» II'IIIUWIIKI hni.inn.itj oi thai i

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant, Tnnv Mnpstas

w,is, represented at trial by

Mr. Victor Gordon.
2.

I lie Lour I ha a reviewed iw ,nJt.. on I

file maintained by the Utah Department of Corrections.

3.

Defense counsel gained access to said records puisudiil, In Hie

Govern • e ml RWUJKI'I Access, and Manaq^fiiHif ""'ml I If.ih rncie Ann ^ 63-2-101 et. sec.

(1993).
4.
Boreai

The wourt has reviewed records maintained ib" 11" n • Mr ^stigalmns

I, I'l i" I III.-iihi Dppartment of Corrections relating to the arrest and conviction of

Tony Maestas, and the use of Tony Waldron as a confidential informant.
5.

Dei en si.1 u i u n

-

the

Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec.
(1993).
6. '

ThiP .ifnrem.entioned records contain the following information:

7.

Tony Waldron (Waldron) was committed to the prison on November

5, 1990, on a convictioi i

-

eji

- )'nip

3

Waldron's expected release cate Ton ,.:ison was January 14, 1993.

9.

As late as February

7

Jl

°°n

Waldron's expected release date

rei ni II.,ilined unchanged
On August 15, 199 1, Waldron was assigned to work at the prison
dairy.
i i.

Oi i November *.w,

1991, W a Minn was one of thi ee inmates

suspected of smuggling drugs at the dairy n. •.
12.

Die k.

Hn rv-l HI 11, in y ' 1 1 :I;T; < A -- • -

-;iS fnund to have injection sites on

his arm, Waldi or i admitted he had been injecting steroids at the dairy.

2

13.

Waldron was recruited h ' ' ** ' , , / n /
J

Depart.
On March

a

n investigator witl i the

i nnfidpnlMl iiiiilnnii.'int

. ., . - 9 2 , Waldron was m n v w i from D-block on a

temporary restriction order because he was "under investigation".
15.

f

Caldron was released on a home visit where

he agreed to purcha-.-operation

. >.e smuggled into the orison as part of an undercover
-•

16.

: t is.

On March 14, 1992, Tony Maestas was arrested for allegedly selling

cocaine to Tony Waldron.
17.

*-

of Pardons. A Special Attentat

was held by the Board

no is a revie\A ic ^ r a r t r elief to inmates under

special circumstances w h e i e J ctianyt ui slatiK "VJ1, U ' v lUJMletJ
18.

Waldron was paroled that G«J. , ,e was serving time for ten counts

of Forgery, second degree felonies, one count of Fraud, a third degree feloi ly, and an
additional

I ni I > rrjpf
19.

i II

1 Ipqrpp fplnny.

Waldron was never formally disciplined for possession of a controlled

substance or drug paraphernalia.
20.

Waldron was never charged with Possession of a Controlled

Substance or Drug Paraphernalia,,,
21.

Waldrr

„v

• - rhnnrr* i

i

,-snl' . r >S Pppartment oi "

Corrections' ir ivestig. ati ' J i that began November 28, 1 9 9 1 , ot his involvement ii i
s i i 11.J g g 11 r I g d f u g s it r 11: o Dfa1 o c k.
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22.

Leu LLK v. "

/esticja'"' " iili ihi,1 Rpparirnnnl ni Onrnpofions who

i e< : i ni ilte :J Waldron, in a written statement, claimed that the only compensation Waldron
recejvecj

f0 his role as a confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the

Boaru

- * * result of a dirty urine test.
23.

A review of Waldron's prisoi i files also revealed the following

information relevant to his credibility:
a.

Waldron was convicted on September 14, 1992, of Forgery,

a second degree felony, as well as Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and Felony
Fleeing.
b.

Waldron was convicted on December 12, 1990, of two counts

of Forgery, second degree felonies.
c.
Prison <

On August 7,1986, Waldron was committed to the Utah State

me count of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third degree felony, seven

counts ot Fjigeiv, bevjiid1 'lejiey felonieb .nri"! Mit' '".runl "I F" "i"«",|pi ,,", ;\

IIIIM)

d* :jree

felony.
d.

Waldron had been assessed by the Department of Corrections

in !°FP and Lid hr^n ip r ,rnh rr] as j n ii,mafe who "cannot be trusted at all".
e.

In October of 1990, Waldron approached Lrr. Brian with the
bin ini i PI itiesti;1! I i ise

of Waldron for an undercover uiv'jstiy.itini

AP&P determined that "it would not be wise

to allow him to participate"1" because ot his history ol drug dependency and attempted
escape. Waldror i was told "there would be no special consideration".

4

24

Also relevant to Waldron's credibiiity was the following information

prison:
a.

The investigation into V V'aldion and other iniiidle'.. thai began

in November of 1991 involved allegations that inmates were smuggling drugs by either
hiding them in balloons in the mouth, or by "keistering" the drugs by hiding them in the
ani„ ill oa ilh
b.
i

- -

On November 10,1989, Waidron was disciplined for a positive

:r,uana and for hiding a white object ir i his mouth which he swallowed

before guards could retrieve it.
c.

On November 20, 1989, Waidron admitted hiding two

a "pocket" he had cut inside his coat yv.
d.

the guard was not looking.

Oi i January 1, 1988, \ Waidron was disciplined for Possession

of a Controlled Substance four id hidden in i his sock
e.
a

On May 29, 1988, Waidron was disciplined for possession of

inti'i ilh'il sulistanee.
f.

On June 7, 1988, Waldroi i was disciplined foi a positive

urinalysis for marijuana..
g

on March 30, 1987, Waldnin vas flisnplmed fni possession

of a controlled substance.

5

25.

A review of Waldron's prison file also revealed the following

a.

On v

1992, Waldron had safety concerns at the Weber

County Jail because he had testified against other ii u i iates.
b.

On November c i, 1990, Waldron asked to be movrrl because

of involvement in past drug dealing at the prison,
c.

V"" i a Id IUN' 1 , ', l f! <.' i ',:i e

h1 eassessn ie 1<1 ' u i « "'" d i o•.' I ^ I i:" 1 lad

safety concerns in February of 1990 and also in July of 1 9 9 1
26.

In respect to the chain of custody in Mr. Maestas' case, it was also

by the custodian :f the evicencff
DATED t . ^ ^

'

•
BY THE COURT:

r i U D G E WfLLI,
Third District C

Approved as to form:

?
/

RICHARD S. SHEPHERD^
Deputy District Attorney

/

c

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant

M

•

•

-

Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this
December, 1997.
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day of
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1

THE COURT:

The Court finds there has

2

been a violation of the terms of the conditions of

3

probation.

4

intentional under circumstances where the defendant

5

had the ability to comply with the Court's order on

6

the conditions of probation.

7

will be revoked.

8

are only so many chances that the Court has the

9

disposition or the opportunity to grant them in one

10

case and deny them in another because there are only

11

limited resources out there.

12

those resources to the people who have indicated they

13

will take advantage of that. And that is not so in

14

this case.

That violation was knowing and

Therefore probation

It will not be reinstated.

There

We need to provide

15

I do think, however, given the amount of

16

delay that has occurred and since the feeling of the

17

affidavit is in support of the order to show cause

18

and this is a unique case, the defendant is entitled

19

to credit for time served in the Salt Lake County

20

Jail.

21

the minute entry and in the order —

22

going to have to prepare papers for me on this, Mr.

23

Shepherd.

24

the Court is aware of the view of the Department of

I would ask the clerk to note specifically in
well, you're

Would you note specifically in there that

25 I Corrections that credit for time served is not
15
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

1

normally granted by them when the time served is a

2

result of an order to show cause. And the credit for

3

time served normally is limited only to pretrial

4

time.

5

credit for time served during the pendency of this

6

matter.

And it's my recommendation that he be given

7
8
9
10 I

Is there anything else?

If not, we'll be

in recess.
(Concluded at 4:45 p.m.)
—oOo—

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
16
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HAVE SPONTANEOUS TESTIMONY.

TONY WALDRON.
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

DIRECT EXAMINATION.
BY MR. SHEPHERD:
Q.

WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME.

A.

TONY WALDRON.

Q.

WILL YOU SPELL THAT, PLEASE.

A.

W-A-L-D-R-O-N.

Q.

MR. WALDRON, ARE YOU PRESENTLY AN INMATE AT

THE UTAH STATE PRISON?
A.

YES, I AM.

Q.

DIRECTING YOUR ATTENTION TO THE 14TH OF

MARCH OF 1992, WERE YOU AN INMATE ON THAT DATE?
A.

YES, I WAS.

Q.

AND ON THAT DATE DID YOU ASSIST LEO LUCEY

IN A DEPARTMENT OF OF CORRECTIONS INVESTIGATION
RELATIVE TO ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE SOME PEOPLE WHO
WERE PROVIDING SOURCES FOR NARCOTICS IN THE PRISON?
A.

YES.

I DID.

Q.

DID YOU GO IN THE COMPANY OF AN AGENT NAMED

TERESA GABALDON?

81
1

A.

YES, I DID.

2

Q.

ON THAT DATE DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO TO

3

AN APARTMENT LOCATED ON APPROXIMATELY FIFTH EAST

4

JUST SOUTH OF 33RD SOUTH-

5

APARTMENT OF JEANETTE APPLEMAN?

I BELIEVE IT WAS THE

6

A.

YES, SIR.

7

Q.

NOW, DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO GO INTO

8

MS. APPLEMAN'S APARTMENT WHILE TERESA GABALDON

9

REMAINED IN THE CAR?

10

A.

YES.

11

Q.

AND WERE YOU AWARE THAT MS. GABALDON AND

12

JEANETTE APPLEMAN WERE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE CONTACT

13

WITH SOMEONE TO SEE IF THEY COULD ARRANGE THE

14

PURCHASE OF COCAINE?

15

A.

YES.

16

Q.

WHILE YOU WERE IN THE APARTMENT, DID

17

SOMEONE COME TO THE APARTMENT AND MAKE SOME CONTACT

18

WITH HE YOU THERE?

19

A.

YES, THEY DID.

20

Q.

WAS ANYONE ELSE IN THE APARTMENT AT THE

21

TIME?

22

A.

THERE WAS.

23

Q.

WHO WAS THAT?

24

A.

MR. CHACON AND A COUPLE OF CHILDREN.

25

Q.

DID SOMEONE ELSE COME TO THE APARTMENT?

A.

YES, THEY DID.

Q.

WHO WAS THAT?

A.

MR. MAESTAS.

Q.

MR. MAESTAS?

A.

AND ANOTHER FELLOW.

Q.

ANOTHER PERSON?

A.

YES.

Q.

WHEN THEY CAME TO THE APARTMENT, WHAT DID

THEY DO?
A.

THEY COME AND ASKED FOR JEANETTE, AND WE

SAID THAT SHE WAS MAKING A PHONE CALL TRYING TO GET
SOME COCAINE.
Q.

WHAT HAPPENED THEN?

A.

HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I

HAVE THIS RIGHT HERE."
Q.

WHO SAID THAT?

A.

MR. MAESTAS.

Q.

NOW, HE SAID WHAT?

A.

HE PULLED OUT A LITTLE BAG AND SAYS, "I

HAVE THIS."THIS.
Q.

"I HAVE THIS"?

A.

YES.

Q.

AND WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM?

A.

I TOLD HIM I WASN'T.

Q.

WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM THAT YOU WERE, IF

ASKED ME I WAS A COP.

1

ANYTHING?

2

A.

ON A HOME VISIT.

3

Q.

THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

4

A.

WELL, WHEN HE BROUGHT OUT —

5

LEFT.

6

HUNDRED DOLLARS.

7

AND HE LEFT.

HE SHOWED ME THE COCAINE, AND I GAVE HIM ONE

8
9
10

HIS FRIEND

HE SAYS, "WELL, I'M GOING TO GO."

I WENT IN THE BATHROOM, BECAUSE I WAS
WIRED, AND TOLD LEO AND THEM TO GET THE TWO MEXICANS
THAT LEFT THE APARTMENT BUILDING.

11

Q.

WHERE DID YOU OBTAIN THE MONEY?

12

A.

YES, SIR.

13

Q.

HAD YOU BEEN SEARCHED PRIOR TO THIS

14

FROM LEO?

OPERATION BEGINNING?

15

A.

YES.

16

Q.

WHO DID THAT SEARCH?

17

A.

LEO LUCEY.

18

Q.

WERE YOU SEARCHED AFTER THE OPERATION?

19

A.

YES.

20

Q.

AND WAS THAT BY ALSO LEO?

21

A.

YES.

22

Q.

NOW, AFTER YOU OBTAINED THE ALLEGED

23

COCAINE, AND INDICATED ON THE WIRE THAT IT HAD

24

HAPPENED, WHAT DID YOU DO THEN?

25

A.

JUST REMAINED IN THE APARTMENT.
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Q.

THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

A.

THEN WE —

OVER.

I GUESS THEY WENT AND PULLED HIM

THEN SOME RELATION OF HIS LIVES NEXT DOOR,

AND WE WERE GIVEN SOME MARIJUANA FROM THEM.
Q.

WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE COCAINE?

A.

I TOOK IT DOWN TO TERESA AND GIVE TO HER.

Q.

YOU GAVE IT TO HER?

A.

YES.

Q.

THEN DID YOU GO BACK TO THE APARTMENT?

A.

YES.

Q.

I WILL SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS

EXHIBIT TWO FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES.
JUST LIKE TO LOOK AT THAT.

IF YOU'D

DOES THAT APPEAR TO BE

THE SAME OR SIMILAR TO THE PACKAGE THAT YOU OBTAINED
FROM MR. MAESTAS?
A.

YES.
MR. SHEPHERD:

THANK YOU.

I HAVE NO

FURTHER QUESTIONS.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.
BY MR. GORDON:
Q.

WERE YOU USING DRUGS THAT DAY?

A.

NO.

Q.

HAVE YOU USED DRUGS IN THE PAST?

A.

YES, I HAVE.
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Q.

SO YOU KNOW WHAT THEY LOOK LIKE?

A.

YES, I DO.

Q.

HAVE YOU USED ANY DRUGS SUBSEQUENT TO THAT?
MR. SHEPHERD:

I OBJECT.

I DON'T THINK

THAT'S RELEVANT TO THIS.

PATTERN.

THE COURT:

WHAT'S THE RELEVANCE?

MR. GORDON:

WELL, IT'S A CONTINUING

HE'S A HABITUAL USER, AND I WANTED TO SHOW

THAT.
THE COURT:

SUSTAINED.

YOU DON'T NEED TO

ANSWER THE QUESTION.
Q.

(BY MR. GORDON)

ARE YOU CURRENTLY SERVING

TIME ON A DRUG-RELATED OFFENSE.
A.

NO, I'M NOT.

Q.

OKAY.

WHEN DID YOU HAVE YOUR HOME VISIT?

WHY DID YOU TAKE YOUR HOME VISIT TIME TO INVOLVE
YOURSELF IN —
A.

IN A RISKY KIND OF PROJECT?

I WAS —

MR. LEO SAID HE'D WRITE ME A GOOD

RECOMMENDATION TO THE BOARD.
Q.

SO YOU WERE PROMISED A GOOD RECOMMENDATION

IF YOU HELPED OUT?
A.

I WAS PROMISED A LETTER.

Q.

NOW—
THE COURT:

YOUR VOICE UP.

THAT WAS IT.

MR. WALDRON, YOU NEED TO KEEP

IT'S HARD TO HEAR YOU.
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THE WITNESS: OKAY.
Q.
ME SEE —

(BY MR- GORDON)

NOW LET ME ASK YOU— LET

DESCRIBE TO ME WHAT HAPPENED ON THAT

PARTICULAR DAY?

YOU STARTED OUT AT WHAT, ABOUT

EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING?
A.

YES.

Q.

YOU WERE SEARCHED AT EIGHT O'CLOCK IN THE

MORNING?
A.

YES.

Q.

OKAY.

A.

I THINK IT WAS THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS.

Q.

AND A WIRE WAS PLACED ON YOU AT THAT TIME?

A.

YES, IT WAS.

Q.

HOW MANY TIMES WERE YOU SEARCHED THAT DAY?

A.

APPROXIMATELY FIVE.

Q.

WHAT KIND OF SEARCH WAS THAT?

A.

PAT DOWN.

Q.

PAT DOWN?

A.

I TOOK MY SHOES OFF.

Q.

SO THEY DIDN'T REALLY —

AND HOW MUCH MONEY WERE YOU GIVEN?

NO BODY CAVITIES

WERE SEARCHED ON ANY OF THOSE?
A.

NO.

Q.

NO.

OKAY.

LET ME ASK YOU THIS.

YOU WERE

SITTING UP IN AN APARTMENT AT THE VILLA FRANCHAIS,
MAYBE AROUND NOON, EVERYBODY HAD GONE.

YOU WERE

1

WATCHING CHILDREN?

2

A.

I WAS WITH MS. CHACON.

3

Q.

SHE FINALLY LEFT, AND YOU WERE BY YOURSELF?

4

A.

NO.

5

Q.

THERE WAS NO TIME THAT YOU BY YOURSELF?

61

A.

NO, THERE WASN'T.

7

Q.

LET ME ~

SHE NEVER LEFT.

SO IF I CAN REFRESH YOUR MEMORY,

8

YOU ARE SPEAKING OVER THE WIRE AND YOU'RE SAYING,

9

"HOW'RE YOU DOING?

10

I AM TALKING TO A BABY, SO YOU

DON'T THINK I AM HERE TALKING TO MYSELF."

11

A.

YES.

12

Q.

SHE WAS IN THE BATHROOM, SO YOU WERE ACTUAL

13

MS. CHACON WAS IN THE BATHROOM.

BY YOURSELF, HUH?

14

A.

IN THE LIVING ROOM.

15

Q.

HUH?

16

A.

YES.

17

Q.

THIS SAYS, "TERESA AND THE LADY THAT LIVES

18

YES.

I WAS TEN FEET AWAY FROM HER.

HERE WENT TO GO PAGE THE GUY TO GET SOME COKE."

19

A.

YES.

20

Q.

DO YOU RECALL THAT?

21

A.

YES.

22

Q.

"THEY SHOULD BE BACK IN A MINUTE.

THEY

23

HAVE GOT ME HERE LISTENING TO NIGGER MUSIC."

24

REMEMBER THAT?

25

A.

YES.

DO YOU

1

Q.

DO YOU REMEMBER SAYING THAT?

2

A.

YES, I DO.

3

Q.

WHY WOULD YOU MAKE A STATEMENT LIKE THAT?

4

DO YOU HAVE A PROBLEM WITH BLACK PEOPLE?

5

A.

NO.

6

Q.

THAT WAS PLAIN LANGUAGE.

7

IN PRISON?

8

A.

YES.

9

Q.

WERE YOU EVER STRIPPED?

10

A.

WHEN I WENT TO PRISON —

11

MEXICANS?

I LIVE WITH THEM.
FROM WHEN YOU ARE

BACK TO PRISON

THAT NIGHT, YES, I WAS.

12

Q.

BUT YOU WEREN'T STRIPPED DURING THE DAY?

13

A.

NO.

14

Q.

WHY WERE YOU RECRUITED?

15

A.

YES.

16

Q.

YOU VOLUNTEERED FOR THIS PROJECT.

17

A.

YES.

18

MR. GORDON:

19

MR. SHEPHERD:

20

THE COURT:

21

DID YOU VOLUNTEER?

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.

MAY MR. WALDRON BE EXCUSED,

THEN?

22

MR. SHEPHERD:

23

MR. GORDON:

NO.

24

THE COURT:

THANK YOU, MR. WALDRON.

25

MAY STEP DOWN.

I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT.

YOU MAY BE EXCUSED.

YOU
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MR. SHEPHERD: ASK LEO LUCEY TO COME IN
PLEAS.

LEO LUCEY.
CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS
EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHEPHERD:
Q.

WILL YOU STATE YOUR FULL NAME, PLEASE.

A.

LEO S. LUCEY.

Q.

WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED?

A.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF UTAH.

Q.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS?
A.

FIVE YEARS.

Q.

WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT?

A.

I'M AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS.
Q.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN EMPLOYED AS AN

INVESTIGATOR?
A.

A LITTLE OVER A YEAR.

Q.

WHAT SORT OF TRAINING HAVE YOU HAD, AND

BACKGROUND THAT QUALIFIES YOU FOR THAT POSITION?
A.

I'M A CERTIFIED PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE

